Aug 22, 1996
Gary Webb's Incendiary 1996 SJ Mercury News Exposé
These articles were downloaded from the web site of the Seattle Times,
since the San Jose Mercury News has removed the entire series from
their web site.
Cocaine pipeline financed rebels - Evidence points to CIA knowing of high-volume drug network
by Gary Webb
San Jose Mercury News
For the better part of a decade, a San Francisco Bay Area drug ring sold
tons of cocaine to the Crips and Bloods street gangs of Los Angeles and
funneled millions in drug profits to an arm of the contra guerrillas of
Nicaragua run by the Central Intelligence Agency, the San Jose Mercury
News has found.
This drug network opened the first pipeline between Colombia's cocaine
cartels and the black neighborhoods of Los Angeles, a city now known as
the "crack" capital of the world. The cocaine that flooded in helped spark
a crack explosion in urban America - and provided the cash and connections
needed for L.A.'s gangs to buy weapons.
It is one of the most bizarre alliances in modern history: the union of a
U.S.-backed army attempting to overthrow a revolutionary socialist
government and the "gangstas" of Compton and South-Central Los Angeles.
The army's financiers - who met with CIA agents before and during the
time they were selling the drugs in L.A. - delivered cut-rate cocaine to
the gangs through a young South-Central crack dealer named Ricky Donnell
Unaware of his suppliers' military and political connections, "Freeway Rick" turned the cocaine powder into crack and wholesaled it to gangs across the country.
Drug cash for the contras
Court records show the cash was then used to buy equipment for a
guerrilla army named the Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (Nicaraguan
Democratic Force) or FDN, the largest of several anti-communist groups
commonly called the contras.
While the FDN's war is barely a memory today, black America is still
dealing with its poisonous side effects. Urban neighborhoods are grappling
with legions of homeless crack addicts. Thousands of young black men are
serving long prison sentences for selling cocaine - a drug that was
virtually unobtainable in black neighborhoods before members of the CIA's
army brought it into South-Central in the 1980s at bargain-basement
And the L.A. gangs, which used their enormous cocaine profits to arm
themselves and spread crack across the country, are still thriving.
"There is a saying that the ends justify the means," former FDN leader
and drug dealer Oscar Danilo Blandon Reyes testified during a recent
cocaine-trafficking trial in San Diego. "And that's what Mr. Bermudez (the
CIA agent who commanded the FDN) told us in Honduras, OK? So we started
raising money for the contra revolution."
Recently declassified reports, federal court testimony, undercover tapes,
court records here and abroad and hundreds of hours of interviews over the
past 12 months leave no doubt that Blandon was no ordinary drug dealer.
Shortly before Blandon - who had been the drug ring's Southern California
distributor - took the stand in San Diego as a witness for the U.S.
Department of Justice, federal prosecutors obtained a court order
preventing defense lawyers from delving into his ties to the CIA.
Blandon, one of the FDN's founders in California, "will admit that he was
a large-scale dealer in cocaine, and there is no additional benefit to any
defendant to inquire as to the Central Intelligence Agency," Assistant
U.S. Attorney L.J. O'Neale argued in his motion shortly before Ross' trial
on cocaine-trafficking charges in March.
The 5,000-man FDN, records show, was created in mid-1981 when the CIA
combined several existing groups of anti-communist exiles into a unified
force it hoped would topple the new socialist government of Nicaragua.
Waged a losing war
From 1982 to 1988, the FDN - run by both American and Nicaraguan CIA agents - waged a losing war against Nicaragua's Sandinista government, the Cuban-supported socialists who'd overthrown U.S.-backed dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979.
Blandon, who began working for the FDN's drug operation in late 1981, testified that the drug ring sold almost a ton of cocaine in the United States that year - $54 million worth at prevailing wholesale prices. It was not clear how much of the money found its way back to the CIA's army, but Blandon testified that "whatever we were running in L.A., the profit was going for the contra revolution."
At the time of that testimony, Blandon was a full-time informant for the
Drug Enforcement Administration, a job the U.S. Department of Justice got
him after releasing him from prison in 1994.
Though Blandon admitted to crimes that have sent others away for life,
the Justice Department turned him loose on unsupervised probation after
only 28 months behind bars and has paid him more than $166,000 since,
court records show.
"He has been extraordinarily helpful," federal prosecutor O'Neale told Blandon's judge in a plea for the trafficker's release in 1994. Though O'Neale once described Blandon to a grand jury as "the biggest Nicaraguan cocaine dealer in the United States," the prosecutor would not discuss him with the Mercury News.
Blandon's boss in the FDN's cocaine operation, Juan Norwin Meneses
Cantarero, has never spent a day in a U.S. prison, even though the federal
government has been aware of his cocaine dealings since at least 1974,
Meneses - who ran the drug ring from his homes in the Bay Area - is
listed in the DEA's computers as a major international drug smuggler and
was implicated in 45 separate federal investigations. Yet he and his
cocaine-dealing relatives lived quite openly in the Bay Area for years,
buying homes, bars, restaurants, car lots and factories.
"I even drove my own cars, registered in my name," Meneses said during a
recent interview in Nicaragua.
Meneses' organization was "the target of unsuccessful investigative attempts for many years," O'Neale acknowledged in a 1994 affidavit. But records and interviews revealed that a number of those probes were stymied not by the elusive Meneses but by agencies of the U.S. government.
CIA hampered probes
Agents from four organizations - the DEA, U.S. Customs, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement - have complained that investigations were hampered by the CIA or unnamed "national-security" interests.
One 1988 investigation by a U.S. Senate subcommittee ran into a wall of
official secrecy at the Justice Department.
In that case, congressional records show, Senate investigators were trying to determine why the U.S. attorney in San Francisco, Joseph Russoniello, had given $36,000 back to a Nicaraguan cocaine dealer arrested by the FBI.
The money was returned, court records show, after two contra leaders sent letters to the court swearing that the drug dealer had been given the cash to buy weapons for guerrillas.
After Nicaraguan police arrested Meneses on cocaine charges in Managua in
1991, his judge expressed astonishment that the infamous smuggler went
unmolested by American drug agents during his years in the United States.
His seeming invulnerability amazed American authorities as well.
A Customs agent who investigated Meneses in 1980 before transferring
elsewhere said he was reassigned to San Francisco seven years later "and I
was sitting in some meetings and here's Meneses' name again. And I can
remember thinking, `Holy cow, is this guy still around?' "
Blandon led an equally charmed life. For at least five years he brokered massive amounts of cocaine to the black gangs of Los
Angeles without being arrested. But his luck changed overnight.
On Oct. 27, 1986, agents from the FBI, the IRS, local police and the Los
Angeles County sheriff fanned out across Southern California and raided
more than a dozen locations connected to Blandon's cocaine operation.
Blandon and his wife, along with numerous Nicaraguan associates, were
arrested on drug and weapons charges.
The search-warrant affidavit reveals that local drug agents knew plenty
about Blandon's involvement with cocaine and the CIA's army nearly 10
"Danilo Blandon is in charge of a sophisticated cocaine smuggling and
distribution organization operating in Southern California," L.A. County
sheriff's Sgt. Tom Gordon said in the 1986 affidavit. "The monies gained
from the sales of cocaine are transported to Florida and laundered through
Orlando Murillo, who is a high-ranking officer of a chain of banks in
Florida named Government Securities Corporation. From this bank the monies
are filtered to the contra rebels to buy arms in the war in Nicaragua."
Raids a spectacular failure
Despite their intimate knowledge of Blandon's operations, the police raids were a spectacular failure. Every location had been cleaned of anything remotely incriminating. No one was ever prosecuted.
Ron Spear, a spokesman for Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block, said
Blandon somehow knew that he was under police surveillance.
FBI records show that soon after the raids, Blandon's defense attorney,
Bradley Brunon, called the sheriff's department to suggest that his
client's troubles stemmed from a most unlikely source: a recent
congressional vote authorizing $100 million in military aid to the
According to a December 1986 FBI teletype, Brunon told the officers that
the "CIA winked at this sort of thing. . . . (Brunon) indicated that now
that U.S. Congress had voted funds for the Nicaraguan contra movement,
U.S. government now appears to be turning against organizations like
That FBI report, part of the files of former Iran-contra special
prosecutor Lawrence Walsh, was made public only last year, when it was
released by the National Archives at the San Jose Mercury News' request.
Blandon has also implied that his cocaine sales were, for a time,
CIA-approved. He told a San Francisco federal grand jury in 1994 that once
the FDN began receiving American taxpayer dollars, the CIA no longer
needed his kind of help.
None of the government agencies known to have been involved with Meneses
and Blandon would provide the Mercury News with any information about
them, despite Freedom of Information Act requests.
Blandon's lawyer, Brunon, said in an interview that his client never told
him directly that he was selling cocaine for the CIA, but the prominent
Los Angeles defense attorney drew his own conclusions from the "atmosphere
of CIA and clandestine activities" that surrounded Blandon and his
"Was he involved with the CIA? Probably. Was he involved with drugs? Most
definitely," Brunon said. "Were those two things involved with each other?
They've never said that, obviously. They've never admitted that. But I
don't know where these guys get these big aircraft."
That very topic arose during the sensational 1992 cocaine-trafficking
trial of Meneses after he was arrested in Nicaragua in connection with a
staggering 750-kilo shipment of cocaine. His chief accuser was his friend
Enrique Miranda, a relative and former Nicaraguan military intelligence
officer who had been Meneses' emissary to the cocaine cartel of Bogota,
Colombia. Miranda pleaded guilty to drug charges and agreed to cooperate
in exchange for a seven-year sentence.
In a long, handwritten statement he read to Meneses' jury, Miranda
revealed the deepest secrets of the Meneses drug ring, earning his old
boss a 30-year prison sentence in the process.
"He (Norwin) and his brother Luis Enrique had financed the contra
revolution with the benefits of the cocaine they sold," Miranda wrote.
"This operation, as Norwin told me, was executed with the collaboration of
high-ranking Salvadoran military personnel. They met with officials of the
Salvadoran air force, who flew (planes) to Colombia and then left for the
U.S., bound for an Air Force base in Texas, as he told me."
Meneses - who has close personal and business ties to a Salvadoran
air-force commander and former CIA agent named Marcos Aguado - declined to
discuss Miranda's statements during an interview at a prison outside
Managua in January. He is scheduled to be paroled this summer, after
nearly five years in custody.
U.S. General Accounting Office records confirm that El Salvador's air
force was supplying the CIA's Nicaraguan guerrillas with aircraft and
flight support services throughout the mid-1980s.
The same day the Mercury News requested official permission to interview
Miranda, he disappeared.
While out on a routine weekend furlough, Miranda failed to return to the Nicaraguan jail where he'd been living since 1992. Though his jailers, who described him as a model prisoner, claimed Miranda had escaped, they didn't call the police until a Mercury News correspondent showed up and discovered he was gone.
He has not been seen in nearly a year.
Aug 22, 1996
Salvador air force linked to cocaine flights, Nicaraguan contras, drug dealer's supplier
by Gary Webb
San Jose Mercury News
One thing is certain: There is considerable evidence that El Salvador's air force was deeply involved with cocaine flights, the contras and drug dealer Oscar Danilo Blandon Reyes' cocaine supplier, Norwin Meneses.
Meneses said one of his oldest friends is a former contra pilot named
Marcos Aguado, a Nicaraguan who works for the Salvadoran air-force high
Aguado was identified in 1987 congressional testimony as a CIA agent who
helped the contras get weapons, airplanes and money from a major Colombian
drug trafficker named George Morales. Aguado admitted his role in that
deal in a videotaped deposition taken by a U.S. Senate subcommittee that
His name also turned up in a deposition taken by the congressional
Iran-contra committees that same year. Robert Owen, a courier for Lt. Col.
Oliver North, testified he knew Aguado as a contra pilot and said there
was "concern" about his being involved with drug trafficking.
While flying for the contras, Aguado was stationed at Ilopango Air Base
near El Salvador's capital.
In 1985, the DEA agent assigned to El Salvador - Celerino Castillo III - began picking up reports that cocaine was being flown to the United States out of hangars 4 and 5 at Ilopango as part of a contra-related covert operation. Castillo said he soon confirmed what his informants were telling him.
Starting in January 1986, Castillo began documenting the cocaine flights
- listing pilot names, tail numbers, dates and flight plans - and sent
them to DEA headquarters.
The only response he got, Castillo wrote in his 1994 memoirs, was an
internal DEA investigation of him. He took a disability retirement from
the agency in 1991.
"Basically, the bottom line is it was a covert operation and they (DEA officials) were covering it up," Castillo said in an interview.
"You can't get any simpler than that. It was a cover-up."
Trio created mass market in U.S. for crack cocaine
by Gary Webb
San Jose Mercury News
If they'd been in a more respectable line of work, Norwin Meneses, Oscar Danilo Blandon Reyes and "Freeway Rick" Ross would have been hailed as geniuses of marketing.
This odd trio - a smuggler, a bureaucrat and a ghetto teenager - made
fortunes creating the first mass market in America for a product so
hellishly desirable that consumers will literally kill to get it: "crack"
Federal lawmen will tell you plenty about Rick Ross, mostly about the
evils he visited upon black neighborhoods by spreading the crack plague in
Los Angeles and cities as far east as Cincinnati. Tomorrow, they hope,
Freeway Rick will be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility
But those same officials won't say a word about the two men who turned
Rick Ross into L.A.'s first king of crack, the men who, for at least five
years, supplied him with enough Colombian cocaine to help spawn crack
markets in major cities nationwide. Their critical role in the country's
crack explosion has been a strictly guarded secret.
To understand how crack came to curse black America, you have to go into the volcanic hills overlooking Managua, the capital of the Republic of Nicaragua.
Biggest military upset
During June 1979, those hills teemed with triumphant guerrillas called
Sandinistas - Cuban-assisted revolutionaries who had just pulled off one
of the biggest military upsets in Central American history. In a bloody
civil war, they'd destroyed the U.S.-trained army of Nicaragua's dictator,
In the dictator's doomed capital, a minor member of Somoza's government
decided to skip the war's obvious ending. On June 19, Oscar Danilo Blandon
Reyes gathered his wife and young daughter and flew into exile in
Today, Blandon is a well-paid and highly trusted operative for the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration. Federal officials say he is one of the
DEA's top informants in Latin America, collecting intelligence on
Colombian and Mexican drug lords and setting up stings.
In March, he was the DEA's star witness at a drug trial in San Diego,
where, for the first time, he testified publicly about his strange
interlude between government jobs: the years he sold cocaine to the street
gangs of black Los Angeles.
Blandon swore that he didn't plan on becoming a dope dealer when he
landed in the United States with $100 in his pocket, seeking political
asylum. He did it, he insisted, out of patriotism.
When duty called in late 1981, he was working as a car salesman in East
Los Angeles. In his spare time, he said, he and a few fellow exiles were
working to rebuild Somoza's defeated army, the Nicaraguan national guard,
in hopes of one day returning to Managua in triumph.
But the rallies and cocktail parties the exiles hosted raised little
money. "At this point, he became committed to raising money for
humanitarian and political reasons via illegal activity (cocaine
trafficking for profit)," said a heavily censored parole report, which
surfaced during the March trial.
That venture began, Blandon testified, with a phone call from a wealthy
college friend in Miami.
Blandon said his college chum, who also was working in the resistance
movement, dispatched him to Los Angeles International Airport to pick up
another exile, Juan Norwin Meneses Cantarero. Though their families were
related, Blandon said, he'd never met Meneses until that day.
"I picked him up, and he started telling me that we had to (raise) some
money and to send to Honduras," Blandon testified. He said he flew with
Meneses to a camp there and met one of his new companion's old friends,
Col. Enrique Bermudez.
Bermudez - who'd been Somoza's Washington liaison to the American
military - was hired by the Central Intelligence Agency in mid-1980 to
pull together the remnants of Somoza's vanquished national guard, records
show. In August 1981, Bermudez's efforts were unveiled at a news
conference as the Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN) - in English, the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force. It was the largest and best-organized of the
handful of guerrilla groups known as the contras.
Bermudez was the FDN's military chief and, according to congressional
records and newspaper reports, received regular CIA paychecks for a
decade, payments that stopped shortly before his still-unsolved slaying in
Managua in 1991.
Reagan OKs covert operations
White House records show that shortly before Blandon's meeting with Bermudez, President Reagan had given the CIA the green light to begin covert paramilitary operations against the Sandinista government. But Reagan's secret Dec. 1, 1981, order permitted the spy agency to spend only $19.9 million on the project, an amount CIA officials acknowledged was not nearly enough to field a credible fighting force.
After meeting with Bermudez, Blandon testified, he and Meneses "started
raising money for the contra revolution."
While Blandon says Bermudez didn't know cocaine would be the fund-raising device they used, the presence of the mysterious Mr. Meneses strongly suggests otherwise.
Norwin Meneses, known in Nicaraguan newspapers as "Rey de la Droga" (King
of Drugs), was then under active investigation by the DEA and the FBI for
smuggling cocaine into the United States, records show.
And Bermudez was very familiar with the influential Meneses family. He had served under two Meneses brothers, Fermin and Edmundo, who were generals in Somoza's army.
Despite a stack of law-enforcement reports describing him as a major drug
trafficker, Norwin Meneses was welcomed into the United States in July
1979 as a political refugee and given a visa and a work permit. He settled
in the San Francisco Bay Area, and for the next six years supervised the
importation of thousands of kilos of cocaine into California.
At the meeting with Bermudez, Meneses said in a recent interview, the
contra commander put him in charge of "intelligence and security" for the
FDN in California.
Blandon, he said, was assigned to raise money in Los Angeles.
Blandon said Meneses gave him two kilograms of cocaine (roughly 4 1/2 pounds) and sent him to Los Angeles.
"Meneses was pushing me every week," he testified. "It took me about three months, four months to sell those two keys because I didn't know what to do. . . ."
To find customers, Blandon and several other Nicaraguan exiles working
with him headed for the vast, untapped markets of L.A.'s black ghettos.
Blandon's marketing strategy, selling the world's most expensive street
drug in some of California's poorest neighborhoods, might seem baffling,
but in retrospect, his timing was uncanny. He and his compatriots arrived
in South-Central L.A. right when street-level drug users were figuring out
how to make cocaine affordable: by changing the pricey white powder into
powerful little nuggets that could be smoked - crack.
Emergence of crack
Crack turned the cocaine world on its head. Cocaine smokers got an explosive high unmatched by 10 times as much snorted powder. And since only a tiny amount was needed for that rush, cocaine no longer had to be sold in large, expensive quantities. Anyone with $20 could get wasted.
It was a "substance that is tailor-made to addict people," Dr. Robert
Byck, a Yale University cocaine expert, said during congressional
testimony in 1986. "It is as though (McDonald's founder) Ray Kroc had
invented the opium den."
Crack's Kroc was a disillusioned 19-year-old named Ricky Donnell Ross,
who, at the dawn of the 1980s, found himself adrift on the streets of
South-Central Los Angeles.
A talented tennis player for Dorsey High School, Ross had recently seen
his dream of a college scholarship evaporate when his coach discovered he
could neither read nor write.
A friend of Ross' - a college football player home at Christmas from San
Jose State University - told him "cocaine was going to be the new thing,
that everybody was doing it." Intrigued, Ross set off to find out more.
Through a cocaine-using auto-upholstery teacher Ross knew, he met a
Nicaraguan named Henry Corrales, who began selling Ross and a friend ,
Ollie "Big Loc" Newell, small amounts of remarkably inexpensive cocaine.
Thanks to a network of friends in South-Central L.A. and Compton,
including many members of various Crips gangs, the pair steadily built up
clientele. With each sale, Ross reinvested his hefty profits in more
Eventually, Corrales introduced Ross and Newell to his supplier, Blandon.
And then business really picked up.
"At first, we was just going to do it until we made $5,000," Ross said.
"We made that so fast we said, no, we'll quit when we make $20,000. Then
we was going to quit when we saved enough to buy a house . . ."
Ross would eventually own millions of dollars' worth of real estate
across Southern California, including houses, motels, a theater and
several other businesses. (His nickname, "Freeway Rick," came from the
fact that he owned properties near the Harbor Freeway in Los Angeles.)
Within a year, Ross' drug operation grew to dominate inner-city Los
Angeles, and many of the biggest dealers in town were his customers. When
crack hit L.A.'s streets hard in late 1983, Ross already had the
infrastructure in place to corner a huge chunk of the burgeoning market.
It was not uncommon, he said, to move $2 million or $3 million worth of
crack in one day.
"Our biggest problem had got to be counting the money," Ross said. "We got to the point where it was like, man, we don't want to count no more money."
Nicaraguan cocaine dealer Jacinto Torres, another former supplier of Ross
and a sometime-partner of Blandon, told drug agents in a 1992 interview
that after a slow start, "Blandon's cocaine business dramatically
increased. . . . Norwin Meneses, Blandon's supplier as of 1983 and 1984,
routinely flew quantities of 200 to 400 kilograms from Miami to the West
Blandon told the DEA last year that he was selling Ross up to 100 kilos of cocaine a week, which was then "rocked up" and distributed "to the major gangs in the area, specifically the Crips and the Bloods," the DEA report said.
At wholesale prices, that's roughly $65 million to $130 million worth of
cocaine every year, depending on the going price of a kilo.
"He was one of the main distributors down here," said former Los Angeles
Police Department narcotics detective Steve Polak, who was part of the
Freeway Rick Task Force, which was set up in 1987 to put Ross out of
business. "And his poison, there's no telling how many tens of thousands
of people he touched. He's responsible for a major cancer that still
hasn't stopped spreading."
But Ross is the first to admit that being in the right place at the right
time had almost nothing to do with his amazing success. Other L.A.
dealers, he noted, were selling crack long before he started.
What he had, and they didn't, was Blandon, a friend with a seemingly
inexhaustible supply of high-grade cocaine and an expert's knowledge of
how to market it.
"I'm not saying I wouldn't have been a dope dealer without Danilo," Ross
stressed. "But I wouldn't have been Freeway Rick."
The secret to his success, Ross said, was Blandon's cocaine prices. "It was unreal. We were just wiping out everybody."
"It didn't make no difference to Rick what anyone else was selling it
for. Rick would just go in and undercut him $10,000 a key," Chico Brown
said. "Say some dude was selling for 30. Boom - Rick would go in and sell
it for 20. If he was selling for 20, Rick would sell for 10. Sometimes, he
be giving (it) away."
Ross said he never discovered how Blandon was able to get cocaine so
cheaply. "I just figured he knew the people, you know what I'm saying? He
But Freeway Rick had no idea just how "plugged" his erudite cocaine broker was. He didn't know about Meneses, or the CIA, or the Salvadoran air-force planes that allegedly were flying the cocaine into an air base in Texas.
And he wouldn't find out about it for another 10 years.
Aug 22, 1996
Crack was born during 1974 in S.F. Bay Area
by Gary Webb
San Jose Mercury News
Though Miami and Los Angeles are commonly regarded as the twin cradles of crack, the first government-financed study of cocaine smoking concluded that it was actually born in the Bay Area in January 1974.
After comedian Richard Pryor nearly immolated himself during a
cocaine-smoking binge in 1980, the National Institute on Drug Abuse hired
UCLA drug expert Ronald Siegel to look into the then-unfamiliar practice.
Siegel, the first scientist to document crack's use in the United States, traced the smoking habit back to 1930, when Colombians first started it.
But what was being smoked south of the border - a paste-like substance
called BASE (bah-SAY) - was very different from what Californians were
putting in their pipes, Siegel found, even though they called it the same
thing: free base.
BASE was a crude, toxics-laden precursor to cocaine powder. On the other hand, free base (which later became known as crack or rock) was cocaine powder that had been reverse-engineered to make it smokable.
When San Francisco Bay Area dealers tried recreating the drug they'd seen in South America, Siegel learned, they'd screwed up.
"When they looked it up in the Merck Manual, they saw cocaine base and
thought, well, yeah, this is it," Siegel, a nationally known drug
researcher, said. "They mispronounced it, misunderstood the Spanish, and
thought (BASE) was cocaine base."
The base described in the organic-chemistry handbook was cocaine powder separated from its salts, a process easily done with boiling water and baking soda.
It was an immediate, if unintentional, hit.
"They were wowed by it," Siegel said. "They thought they were smoking
BASE. They were not. They were smoking something nobody on the planet had
ever smoked before."
Using the sales records of several major drug-paraphernalia companies,
Siegel correlated crack's public appearance with the appearance of
base-making kits and glass pipes for smoking it. The sales records zeroed
in on the Bay Area.
"We were able to show to our satisfaction that they were directly
responsible for distributing the habit throughout the United States,"
"Wherever they were selling their kits, that's where we started getting
the clinical reports. It all started in Northern California."
His groundbreaking study was never published by the government, purportedly for budgetary reasons.
Siegel, who said he grew concerned that the information would not be made available to other researchers, published it himself in an obscure medical journal in late 1982.
Aug 23, 1996
Drug king free, but black aide sits in jail - How cheap cocaine became the scourge of the inner city
by Gary Webb
San Jose Mercury News
For the past 1 1/2 years, the U.S. Department of Justice has been trying to explain why nearly everyone convicted in California's federal courts of "crack" cocaine trafficking is black.
Critics, including some federal-court judges, say it looks like the
Justice Department is targeting crack dealers by race, which would be a
violation of the Constitution.
Federal prosecutors, however, say there's a simple, if unpleasant, reason
for the lopsided statistics: Most crack dealers are black.
But why - of all the ethnic and racial groups in California to pick from
- crack planted its deadly roots in L.A.'s black neighborhoods is
something Oscar Danilo Blandon Reyes may be able to answer.
Blandon is the Johnny Appleseed of crack in California - the Crips' and
Bloods' first direct connect to the cocaine cartels of Colombia. The tons
of cut-rate cocaine he brought into black L.A. during the 1980s and early
1990s became millions of rocks of crack, which spawned new markets
wherever they landed.
On a tape made by the Drug Enforcement Administration in July 1990,
Blandon casually explained the flood of cocaine that coursed through the
streets of South-Central Los Angeles during the previous decade.
"These people have been working with me 10 years," Blandon said. "I've
sold them about 2,000 or 4,000 (kilos). I don't know. I don't remember how
"It ain't that Japanese guy you were talking about, is it?" asked DEA
informant John Arman, who was wearing a hidden transmitter.
"No, it's not him," Blandon insisted. "These . . . these are the black people."
Arman gasped. "Black?!"
"Yeah," Blandon said. "They control L.A. The people (black cocaine
dealers) that control L.A."
But unlike the thousands of young blacks now serving long federal prison
sentences for selling mere handfuls of the drug, Blandon is a free man
today. He has a spacious new home in Nicaragua and a business exporting
precious woods, courtesy of the U.S. government, which has paid him more
than $166,000 over the past 18 months, records show - for his help in the
war on drugs.
That turn of events both amuses and angers "Freeway Rick" Ross, L.A.'s
premier crack wholesaler during much of the 1980s and Blandon's biggest
"They say I sold dope everywhere, but, man, I know he done sold 10 times
more dope than me," Ross said during a recent interview.
Nothing epitomizes the drug war's uneven impact on black Americans more
clearly than the intertwined lives of Ricky Donnell Ross, a high-school
dropout, and his suave cocaine supplier, Blandon, who has a master's
degree in marketing and was one of the top civilian leaders in California
of an anti-communist guerrilla army formed by the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency. Called the Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN), it
became known to most Americans as the contras.
In recent court testimony, Blandon, who began dealing cocaine in
South-Central L.A. in 1982, swore that the first kilo of cocaine he sold
in California was to raise money for the CIA's army, which was trying on a
shoestring to unseat Nicaragua's new socialist Sandinista government.
After Blandon crossed paths with Ross, a South-Central teenager with gang
connections and street smarts necessary to move the army's cocaine, a
blizzard engulfed the ghettos.
Former Los Angeles police narcotics detective Stephen Polak said he was
working the streets of South-Central in the mid-1980s when he and his
partners began seeing more cocaine than ever before.
"A lot of detectives, a lot of cops, were saying, `hey, these blacks, no
longer are we just seeing gram dealers. These guys are doing ounces; they
were doing keys,' " Polak recalled. But he said the reports were
disregarded by higher-ups who couldn't believe black neighborhoods could
afford the amount of cocaine the street cops claimed to be seeing.
"Major Violators (the LAPD's elite anti-drug unit) was saying, basically,
`ahh, South-Central, how much could they be dealing?' " said Polak. "Well,
they (black dealers) went virtually untouched for a long time."
It wasn't until January 1987 - when crack markets were popping up in
major cities all over the nation - that law-enforcement brass decided to
confront L.A.'s crack problem head-on. They formed the Freeway Rick Task
Force, a cadre of veteran drug agents whose sole mission was to put Rick
Ross out of business. Polak was a charter member.
"We just dedicated seven days a week to him. We were just on him at every
move," Polak said.
Ross, as usual, was quick to spot a trend. He moved to Cincinnati and quietly settled into a woodsy, suburban home.
"I called it cooling out, trying to back away from the game," Ross said.
"I had enough money."
His longtime supplier, Blandon, reached the same conclusion about the same time. He moved to Miami with $1.6 million in cash and invested in several businesses.
But neither Ross nor Blandon stayed "retired" for long.
A manic deal-maker, Ross found Cincinnati's virgin crack market too seductive to ignore.
Plunging back in, the crack tycoon cornered the Cincinnati market using
the same low-price, high-volume strategy - and the same Nicaraguan drug
connections - he'd used in L.A. Soon, he also was selling crack in
Cleveland, Indianapolis, Dayton and St. Louis.
"There's no doubt in my mind crack in Cincinnati can be traced to Ross,"
police officer Robert Enoch told a Cincinnati newspaper three years ago.
But Ross' reign in the Midwest was short-lived. In 1988, one of his loads
ran into a drug-sniffing dog at a New Mexico bus station, and drug agents
eventually connected it to Ross. He pleaded guilty to crack trafficking
charges and received a mandatory 10-year prison sentence, which he began
serving in 1990.
In Miami, Blandon's retirement plans also had gone awry as his business
He returned to the San Francisco Bay Area and began brokering cocaine
again, buying and selling from the Nicaraguan dealers he'd known in his
days with the FDN. In 1990 and 1991, he testified, he sold about 425 kilos
of cocaine in Northern California - $10.5 million worth at wholesale
But unlike before, when he was selling cocaine for the contras, Blandon
was constantly dogged by the police.
Twice in six months he was detained, first by Customs agents while taking $117,000 in money orders to Tijuana to pay a supplier, and then by the LAPD when he was in the act of paying one of his Colombian suppliers more than $350,000.
The second time, after police found $14,000 in cash and a small quantity of cocaine in his pocket, he was arrested. But the U.S. Justice Department - saying a prosecution would disrupt an active investigation - persuaded the police to drop their money-laundering case.
Soon after that, Blandon and his wife, Chepita, were arrested by DEA
agents on charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. They were jailed
without bond as dangers to the community, and several other Nicaraguans
also were arrested.
The prosecutor, L.J. O'Neale, told a federal judge that Blandon had sold
so much cocaine in the United States his mandatory prison sentence was
"off the scale."
Then Blandon "just vanished," said Juanita Brooks, a San Diego attorney who represented one of Blandon's co-defendants. "All of a sudden his wife was out of jail and he was out of the case."
The reasons were contained in a secret Justice Department memorandum
filed in San Diego federal court in late 1993.
Blandon, prosecutor O'Neale wrote, had become "valuable in major DEA investigations of Class I drug traffickers." And even though probation officers were recommending a life sentence and a $4 million fine, O'Neale said the government would be satisfied if Blandon got 48 months and no fine. Motion granted.
Less than a year later, records show, O'Neale was back with another idea: Why not just let Blandon go? After all, he wrote the judge, Blandon had a federal job waiting.
O'Neale, saying that Blandon "has almost unlimited potential to assist
the United States," said the government wanted "to enlist Mr. Blandon as a
full-time, paid informant after his release from prison."
After only 28 months in custody, most of it spent with federal agents who
debriefed him for "hundreds of hours," he said, Blandon walked out of the
Metropolitan Correctional Center in San Diego, was given a green card and
began working on his first assignment: setting up his old friend, "Freeway
Rick," for a sting.
Records show Ross was still behind bars, awaiting parole, when San Diego
DEA agents targeted him.
Soon after Ross went to prison for the Cincinnati bust, federal
prosecutors offered him a deal. His term would be shortened by five years
in return for testimony in a federal case against Los Angeles County
Sheriff's detectives that included members of the old Freeway Rick Task
Within days of Ross' parole in October 1994, he and Blandon were back in touch, and their conversation quickly turned to cocaine.
According to tapes Blandon made of some of their discussions, Ross repeatedly told Blandon that he was broke and couldn't afford to finance a drug deal. But Ross did agree to help his old mentor, who was also pleading poverty, find someone else to buy the 100 kilos of cocaine Blandon claimed he had.
On March 2, 1995, in a shopping-center parking lot in National City, near
San Diego, Ross poked his head inside a cocaine-laden Chevy Blazer, and
the place exploded with police.
Ross jumped into a friend's pickup and zoomed off "looking for a wall
that I could crash myself into," he said. "I just wanted to die." He was
captured after the truck careened into a hedgerow. He has been held in
jail without bond since then.
Ross' arrest netted Blandon $45,500 in government rewards and expenses, records show. On the strength of Blandon's testimony, Ross and two other men were convicted of cocaine-conspiracy charges in San Diego last March - conspiring to sell the DEA's cocaine. Sentencing was set for today. Ross is facing a life sentence without the possibility of parole. The other men are looking at 10- to 20-year sentences.
Acquaintances say Blandon, who refused repeated interview requests, is a
common sight these days in Managua's better restaurants, drinking with
friends and telling of his "escape" from U.S. authorities.
According to his Miami lawyer, Blandon spends most of his time shuttling between San Diego and Managua, trying to recover Nicaraguan properties seized in 1979, when the Sandinistas took power.
Aug 23, 1996
Cocaine sentences weighted against blacks
by Gary Webb
San Jose Mercury News
When it comes to cocaine, it isn't just a suspicion that the war on drugs is hammering blacks harder than whites. According to the U.S. Justice Department, it's a fact.
The "main reason" cocaine sentences for blacks are longer than for
whites, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported in 1993, is that 83
percent of the people being sent to prison for "crack" trafficking are
black "and the average sentence imposed for crack trafficking was twice as
long as for trafficking in powdered cocaine."
Even though crack and powder cocaine are the same drug, you have to sell
more than six pounds of powder before you face the same jail time as
someone who sells one ounce of crack - a 100-to-1 ratio.
That logic has eluded Dr. Robert Byck, a Yale University drug expert,
from the moment he discovered the 100-to-1 ratio may have been his
In 1986, at the height of an election-year hysteria over crack, Byck was
summoned before a U.S. Senate committee to tell what he knew about cocaine
Byck, a renowned scientist who edited and published Sigmund Freud's
cocaine papers, had been studying crack smoking in South America for
nearly 10 years, with growing alarm.
Sen. Lawton Chiles, a Florida Democrat (and now that state's governor),
was pushing for tougher crack laws, and he asked Byck about testimony he
had given previously that "some experts" believed crack was 50 times more
addictive than powder cocaine. Byck acknowledged some people believed
Despite the speculative nature of the figure, Byck said, the addictive
factor of 50 was "doubled by people who wanted to get tough on cocaine"
and then, for reasons he still finds incomprehensible, turned into a
measurement of weight.
The resultant 100-to-1 (powder-vs.-crack) weight ratio, Byck said, was "a fabrication by whoever wrote the law, but not reality. . . . You can't make a number."
Recently, the U.S. Sentencing Commission - a panel of experts created by Congress to be its unbiased adviser in these matters - tried and failed to find a better reason to explain why powder dealers must sell 100 times more cocaine before they get the same mandatory sentence as crack dealers.
The "absence of comprehensive data substantiating this legislative policy
is troublesome," it reported last year.
In 1993, cocaine smokers got an average sentence of nearly three years. People who snorted cocaine powder received a little over three months. Nearly all of the long sentences went to blacks, the commission found.
Justice Department researchers estimated that if crack and powder
sentences were made equal, "the black-white difference . . . would not
only evaporate but would slightly reverse."
Based on such findings, the commission recommended in May 1995 that the
cocaine-sentencing laws be equalized, calling the 100-to-1 ratio "a
primary cause of the growing disparity between sentences for black and
white federal defendants."
Apparently fearful of being seen as soft on drugs, Congress voted overwhelmingly last year to keep the crack laws the same. On Oct. 30, President Clinton signed the bill rejecting the commission's recommendations.
Oct. 3, 1996
Affidafit shows CIA knew of contra drug ring
by Gary Webb and Pamela Kramer
LOS ANGELES - During the early 1980s, federal and local narcotics agents knew that a massive drug ring operated by Nicaraguan contra rebels was selling large amounts of cocaine "mainly to blacks living in the South Central Los Angeles area," according to a search-warrant affidavit obtained by the San Jose Mercury News.
The Oct. 23, 1986, affidavit identifies former Nicaraguan government
official Danilo Blandon as "the highest-ranking member of this
organization" and describes a sprawling drug operation involving more than
100 Nicaraguan contra sympathizers.
The affidavit of Thomas Gordon, a former Los Angeles County sheriff's
narcotics detective, is the first independent corroboration that the
contra army - the Nicaraguan Democratic Force - was dealing "crack"
cocaine to gangs in Los Angeles' black neighborhoods. Known by its Spanish
initials, the FDN was an anti-communist commando group formed and run by
the CIA during the 1980s.
Gordon's sworn statement says that both the Drug Enforcement
Administration and the FBI had informants inside the Blandon drug ring for
several years before sheriff's deputies raided it Oct. 27, 1986. Gordon's
affidavit is based on police interviews with those informants and one of
the DEA agents who was investigating Blandon.
Twice during the past year, Ron Spear, Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department spokesman, told the Mercury News that his department had no
records of the 1986 raids and denied having a copy of Gordon's
The Mercury News obtained the entire search-warrant affidavit this week.
Sheriff Sherman Block's office did not respond yesterday to written
questions about the affidavit.
A recent Mercury News series revealed how Blandon's operation, which sold
thousands of kilos of cocaine to black Los Angeles drug dealers, created
the first mass market for crack in America during the early 1980s and
helped fuel a crack explosion that is still reverberating through black
communities. Both the CIA and the Justice Department have denied
But according to a legal motion filed in a 1990 case involving a deputy
who helped execute the search warrants, one of the suspects involved in
the raid identified himself as a CIA agent and asked police to call CIA
headquarters in Virginia to confirm his identity. The motion, filed by Los
Angeles defense attorney Harlan Braun on behalf of Deputy Daniel Garner,
said the narcotics detectives allowed the man to make the call but then
carted away numerous documents purportedly linking the U.S. government to
cocaine trafficking and money-laundering efforts on behalf of the contras.
The motion said CIA agents appeared at the sheriff's department within 48
hours of the raid and removed the seized files from the evidence room. But
Braun said detectives secretly copied 10 pages before the documents were
spirited away. Braun attempted to introduce them in the 1990 criminal
trial to force the federal government to back off the case. Braun was hit
with a gag order, the documents were put under seal and Garner was
convicted of corruption charges.
Internal sheriff's department records of the raid "mysteriously
disappeared" around the same time the seized files were taken, Braun's
motion said. That claim was buttressed in an interview this week by an
officer involved in the raid.
The officer, who requested anonymity, said the alleged CIA agent was Ronald Lister, a former Laguna Beach police detective who worked with Blandon in the drug ring. The 1986 search-warrant affidavit identifies Lister's home in Laguna Beach as one of the places searched. It says Lister was involved in transporting drug money to Miami and was Blandon's partner in a security company. The company, according to a former employee, was doing work at a Salvadoran military air base in the early 1980s.
Lister pleaded guilty to cocaine trafficking in 1991.
Oct. 23, 1996
How Web fueled story of CIA, crack - Difference in format a problem, says editor
by Eleanor Randolph and John M. Broder
Los Angeles Times
WASHINGTON - The controversy that began with the San Jose Mercury News' publication of a series on cocaine and the Nicaraguan contras has become a case study in how information caroms around the country in the digital age.
In its printed version, as the paper's editor has pointed out, the
stories were careful never to claim that the Central Intelligence Agency
condoned or abetted drug dealing to support the contras.
Reporter Gary Webb has said that his research into the CIA-crack
connection "ended at the CIA's door," but did not firmly establish a link
between the agency and the crack epidemic of the 1980s.
But that unproven link has become established as fact in the minds of
many Americans, and the Mercury News' editor, Jerry Ceppos, says the way
the paper used the World Wide Web to disseminate its material may have
contributed to that misinterpretation.
Even before the stories were published in mid-August, managers of the
paper's Web site, Mercury Center, were alerting Internet users to a coming
The electronic version of the series appeared with a logo - a figure smoking crack superimposed on the CIA seal - that was more prominent than in the newspaper series. Underneath were the words, "the story behind the crack explosion."
Many Americans believed that the Mercury News had finally proved what had been a long-running rumor of government complicity in the scourge of drugs in U.S. cities.
Ceppos said earlier this week that editing standards at the paper's Web site are not always consistent with those for the print version of the paper. He said the paper deleted the CIA logo from the Web site after it became controversial.
"We changed the logo, because for a day or two it seemed to be the focus
of attention," Ceppos said. "You have to make sure you're keeping your
standards high, and we're going to have some more conversations about
The series has provoked startlingly different reactions in different
It ignited a storm of controversy on black-oriented radio programs and in such newspapers as Louis Farrakhan's "The Final Call," which headlined its account of the Mercury News story, "How the U.S. government spread crack cocaine in the black ghetto."
Washington talk-radio host Joe Madison, who is also black, is starting a hunger strike to protest the CIA's alleged role in cocaine trafficking. The newspaper series was seen by many as confirmation of what had long been suspected in black neighborhoods. "We've always speculated about this, but now we've got proof," Madison said.
On the other hand, several prominent newspapers have published stories
that have been skeptical about the allegations. The Los Angeles Times, The
Washington Post and The New York Times ran articles this month casting
doubt on a direct link between the cocaine trade and the CIA's support of
The reaction on the "new media" of the Internet has opened an additional
dimension. The Mercury News' Web site received 100,000 additional "hits" a
day after the series was posted, the paper reported.
The paper invited Internet readers to comment, and hundreds replied. Many
indicated that they believed the paper had finally proved that the CIA was
trafficking in cocaine in black neighborhoods.
The Mercury News broke new ground by making available not only the
articles, but much of the supporting documentation - legal affidavits,
court filings, charts, diagrams and interview transcripts.
But a key document that appears to undercut one of the series' central
contentions is made available on the Internet site in heavily edited form
with contradictory material left out.
That document is the court testimony of convicted drug dealer Oscar
Danilo Blandon. The paper's stories lean heavily on Blandon's testimony in
the recent cocaine trafficking trial of Los Angeles drug dealer "Freeway"
Ricky Ross in San Diego.
The stories cite the testimony as establishing that for a period of several years in the early- and mid-1980s, Blandon's drug profits were going to the contras. The Internet site includes portions of the trial transcript that support the story's contentions.
But the complete transcript, which is not included on the Web site, includes statements by Blandon that point in a different direction. According to his testimony, he diverted drug profits to the contras not for years, but only during a period of months early in his career - at a time when he was making virtually no money dealing cocaine.
During the trial, Webb says, he gave questions to Ross' attorney that the
attorney, in turn, asked Blandon under oath. Webb then used the statements
elicited from Blandon as information for his series.
Webb dismisses criticism of the appearance of taking sides in a criminal
case he was covering by saying that the Blandon testimony provided "the
best interview I've ever had - while the man was under oath in a federal
court and being vouched for by two federal agencies."
Ceppos defended his reporter's relationship with Blandon's attorney. "I may be missing something here," he said, "but I think that everything he did with the lawyer was journalistically ethical and aboveboard."
Monday, May 12, 1997
CIA series fell short, says paper
by Associated Press
SAN JOSE, Calif. - The executive editor of the San Jose Mercury News has admitted to shortcomings in the newspaper's controversial series on the crack-cocaine explosion in Los Angeles in the 1980s.
In an open letter to readers in the newspaper's editorial section
yesterday, Jerry Ceppos said the newspaper solidly documented that a drug
ring associated with the contra rebels in Nicaragua sold large quantities
of cocaine in inner-city Los Angeles, and that some of the profits from
those sales went to the contras.
However, he said, the three-part "Dark Alliance" series, published last
summer, occasionally omitted important information and created impressions
open to misinterpretation.
"I believe that we fell short at every step of our process - in the
writing, editing and production of our work. Several people here share
that burden," he wrote.
"We have learned from the experience and even are changing the way we
handle major investigations."
The series, written by reporter Gary Webb, reported that a San Francisco
Bay Area drug ring sold cocaine in South Central Los Angeles, then
funneled profits to the contras for the better part of a decade.
The series traced the drugs to dealers Danilo Blandon and Ricky Ross,
leaders of a CIA-run guerrilla army in Nicaragua.
The Seattle Times ran the series on Aug. 22-23, 1996.
The reports sparked widespread anger in the black community toward the
CIA, as well as numerous federal investigations into whether the CIA took
part in or countenanced the selling of crack cocaine to raise money for
The investigations never found that the CIA had any link to drug dealing.
Several newspapers also disputed the Mercury News report.
Ceppos wrote that while the newspaper did not report the CIA knew about
the drug operations, it implied CIA knowledge.
"Although members of the drug ring met with contra leaders paid by the
CIA and Webb believes the relationship with the CIA was a tight one, I
feel that we did not have proof that top CIA officials knew of the
relationship," he wrote. "I believe that part of our contract with readers
is to be as clear about what we don't know as what we do know.
"We also did not include CIA comment about our findings, and I think we
Ceppos also said the series omitted conflicting information that Blandon testified he stopped sending cocaine profits to the contras at the end of 1982, after being in operation for a year. That information, Ceppos said, "contradicted a central assertion of the series" and should have been included.
The editor also said the series reported the profit figures from the drug
sales as fact when they were estimates, and unfairly suggested the drugs
funneled to Los Angeles played a critical role in the crack problem in
"Because the national crack epidemic was a complex phenomenon that had more than one origin, our discussion of this issue needed to be clearer," Ceppos said.
Wednesday, May 14, 1997
Mercury News retraction won't stop drug probe
by Thomas Farragher
WASHINGTON - A federal investigator said he will continue to examine
whether a California drug ring sold cocaine to aid a CIA-run guerrilla
army, even though the San Jose Mercury News has backed away from some
aspects of the stories that sparked the inquiry.
"We have our own investigative agenda . . ." said Justice Department
Inspector General Michael Bromwich.
The Mercury News series spawned twin investigations by the inspectors general of the CIA and the Justice Department.
Bromwich's comment came after the Mercury News on Sunday acknowledged that its series about shadowy drug dealers didn't meet the paper's standards.
The inspector general drew a distinction between journalistic concerns of Mercury News editors and what interests government investigators. "We're not examining per se the practices in the newspaper that led to the publication of the article," Bromwich said.
In its "Dark Alliance" series published last August, the Mercury News
traced urban America's crack-cocaine explosion to a Northern California
drug ring involving two Nicaraguan cocaine dealers who also were civilian
leaders of the contras, an anti-communist commando group formed and run by
the CIA during the 1980s. The series said millions of dollars in profits
from the drug sales were funneled to the contras. It never reported direct
CIA involvement, though many readers drew that conclusion.
But on Sunday, Mercury News Executive Editor Jerry Ceppos told readers that "we didn't know for certain what the profits were" and that the crack-cocaine scourge "was a complex phenomenon that had more than one origin."
Ceppos also said the newspaper "did not have proof that top CIA officials knew of the relationship" of the drug ring and contra leaders.
Rep. Maxine Waters, D-Calif., the chief congressional champion of a
thorough investigation into the newspaper's findings, insisted yesterday
that the Mercury News, while acknowledging problems with its series, has
not retreated from findings that some drug money went to the contras.
by Charles Overbeck
Dark Alliance author Gary Webb gave a fascinating talk on the evening of January 16, outlining the findings of his investigation of the CIA's connection to drug trafficking by the Nicaraguan contras. Approximately 300 people, crowded into the First United Methodist Church in Eugene, Oregon, listened with rapt attention as Webb detailed his experiences. Webb's riveting speech was followed by an intense question-and-answer session, during which he candidly answered questions about the "Dark Alliance" controversy, his firing from the San Jose Mercury News, and CIA/contra/cocaine secrets that still await revelation.
It was a fascinating exchange packed with detailed information on the latest developments in the case. Webb spoke eloquently, with the ease and confidence of an investigator who has spent many long hours researching his subject, and many more hours sharing this information with the public. ParaScope will have a full report on Webb's talk on Wednesday, January 20.
In the meantime, you get another opportunity to see a ParaScope article come together from scratch, from behind the scenes. So check back with us soon for the latest additions as this piece is developed.
[Last update 1:40 a.m. EST 1/21. Video clips and hypertext annotations coming soon.]
Date: January 16, 1999
Time: 7:30 p.m.
Location: First United Methodist Church, 1376 Olive St., Eugene, Oregon
Gary Webb: I look like an idiot up here with all these mikes, the CIA
agents are probably behind one or the other... [laughter from the
audience]. It's really nice to be in Eugene -- I've been in Madison,
Wisconsin talking about this, I've been in Berkeley, I've been in Santa
Monica, and these are sort of like islands of sanity in this world today,
so it's great to be on one of those islands.
One of the things that is weird about this whole thing, though, is that I've been a daily news reporter for about twenty years, and I've done probably a thousand interviews with people, and the strangest thing is being on the other side of the table now and having reporters ask me questions. One of them asked me about a week ago -- I was on a radio show -- and the host asked me, "Why did you get into newspaper reporting, of all the media? Why did you pick newspapers?" And I really had to admit that I was stumped. Because I thought about it -- I'd been doing newspaper reporting since I was fourteen or fifteen years old -- and I really didn't have an answer.
So I went back to my clip books -- you know, most reporters keep all their old clips -- and I started digging around trying to figure out if there was one story that I had written that had really tipped the balance. And I found it. And I wanted to tell you this story, because it sort of fits into the theme that we're going to talk about tonight.
I think I was fifteen, I was working for my high school paper, and I was writing editorials. This sounds silly now that I think about it, but I had written an editorial against the drill team that we had for the high school games, for the football games. This was '71 or '72, at the height of the protests against the Vietnam War, and I was in school then in suburban Indianapolis -- Dan Quayle country. So, you get the idea of the flavor of the school system. They thought it was a cool idea to dress women up in military uniforms and send them out there to twirl rifles and battle flags at halftime. And I thought this was sort of outrageous, and I wrote an editorial saying I thought it was one of the silliest things I'd ever seen. And my newspaper advisor called me the next day and said, "Gosh, that editorial you wrote has really prompted a response." And I said, "Great, that's the idea, isn't it?" And she said, "Well, it's not so great, they want you to apologize for it." [Laughter from the audience.]
I said, "Apologize for what?" And she said, "Well, the girls were very offended." And I said, "Well, I'm not apologizing because they don't want my opinion. You'll have to come up with a better reason than that." And they said, "Well, if you don't apologize, we're not going to let you in Quill & Scroll," which is the high school journalism society. And I said, "Well, I don't want to be in that organization if I have to apologize to get into it." [More laughter from the audience, scattered applause.]
They were sort of powerless at that point, and they said, "Look, why don't you just come down and the cheerleaders are going to come in, and they want to talk to you and tell you what they think," and I said okay. So I went down to the newspaper office, and there were about fifteen of them sitting around this table, and they all went around one by one telling me what a scumbag I was, and what a terrible guy I was, and how I'd ruined their dates, ruined their complexions, and all sorts of things... [Laughter and groans from the audience.] ...and at that moment, I decided, "Man, this is what I want to do for a living." [Roar of laughter from the audience.] And I wish I could say that it was because I was infused with this sense of the First Amendment, and thinking great thoughts about John Peter Zenger and I.F. Stone... but what I was really thinking was, "Man, this is a great way to meet women!" [More laughter.]
And that's a true story, but the reason I tell you that is because it's often those kinds of weird motivations and unthinking consequences that lead us to do things, that lead us to events that we have absolutely no concept how they're going to turn out. Little did I know that twenty-five years later, I'd be writing a story about the CIA's wrongdoings because I wanted to meet women by writing editorials about cheerleaders.
But that's really the way life and that's really the way history works a lot of times. You know, when you think back on your own lives, from the vantage point of time, you can see it. I mean, think back to the decisions you've made in your lifetimes that brought you to where you are tonight, think about how close you came to never meeting your wife or your husband, how easily you could have been doing something else for a living if it hadn't been for a decision that you made or someone made that you had absolutely no control over. And it's really kind of scary when you think about how capricious life is sometimes. That's a theme I try to bring to my book, Dark Alliance, which was about the crack cocaine explosion in the 1980s.
So for the record, let me just say this right now. I do not believe -- and I have never believed -- that the crack cocaine explosion was a conscious CIA conspiracy, or anybody's conspiracy, to decimate black America. I've never believed that South Central Los Angeles was targeted by the U.S. government to become the crack capitol of the world. But that isn't to say that the CIA's hands or the U.S. government's hands are clean in this matter. Actually, far from it. After spending three years of my life looking into this, I am more convinced than ever that the U.S. government's responsibility for the drug problems in South Central Los Angeles and other inner cities is greater than I ever wrote in the newspaper.
But it's important to differentiate between malign intent and gross negligence. And that's an important distinction, because it's what makes premeditated murder different from manslaughter. That said, it doesn't change the fact that you've got a body on the floor, and that's what I want to talk about tonight, the body.
Many years ago, there was a great series on PBS -- I don't know how many of you are old enough to remember this -- it was called Connections. And it was by a British historian named James Burke. If you don't remember it, it was a marvelous show, very influential on me. And he would take a seemingly inconsequential event in history, and follow it through the ages to see what it spawned as a result. The one show I remember the most clearly was the one he did on how the scarcity of firewood in thirteenth-century Europe led to the development of the steam engine. And you would think, "Well, these things aren't connected at all," and he would show very convincingly that they were.
In the first chapter of the book on which the series is based, Burke wrote that "History is not, as we are so often led to believe, a matter of great men and lonely geniuses pointing the way to the future from their ivory towers. At some point, every member of society is involved in that process by which innovation and change come about. The key to why things change is the key to everything."
What I've attempted to demonstrate in my book was how the collapse of a brutal, pro-American dictatorship in Latin America, combined with a decision by corrupt CIA agents to raise money for a resistance movement by any means necessary, led to he formation of the nation's first major crack market in South Central Los Angeles, which led to the arming and the empowerment of LA's street gangs, which led to the spread of crack to black neighborhoods across the country, and to the passage of racially discriminatory sentencing laws that are locking up thousands of young black men today behind bars for most of their lives.
But it's not so much a conspiracy as a chain reaction. And that's what my whole book is about, this chain reaction. So let me explain the links in this chain a little better.
The first link is this fellow Anastasio Somoza, who was an American-educated tyrant, one of our buddies naturally, and his family ruled Nicaragua for forty years -- thanks to the Nicaraguan National Guard, which we supplied, armed, and funded, because we thought they were, you know, anti-communists.
Well, in 1979, the people of Nicaragua got tired of living under this dictatorship, and they rose up and overthrew it. And a lot of Somoza's friends and relatives and business partners came to the United States, because we had been their allies all these years, including two men whose families had been very close to the dictatorship. And these two guys are sort of two of the three main characters in my book -- a fellow named Danilo Blandón, and a fellow named Norwin Meneses.
They came to the United States in 1979, along with a flood of other Nicaraguan immigrants, most of them middle-class people, most of them former bankers, former insurance salesmen -- sort of a capitalist exodus from Nicaragua. And they got involved when they got here, and they decided they were going to take the country back, they didn't like the fact that they'd been forced out of their country. So they formed these resistance organizations here in the United States, and they began plotting how they were going to kick the Sandanistas out.
At this point in time, Jimmy Carter was president, and Carter wasn't all that interested in helping these folks out. The CIA was, however. And that's where we start getting into this murky world of, you know, who really runs the United States. Is it the president? Is it the bureaucracy? Is it the intelligence community? At different points in time you get different answers. Like today, the idea that Clinton runs the United States is nuts. The idea that Jimmy Carter ran the country is nuts.
In 1979 and 1980, the CIA secretly began visiting these groups that were setting up here in the United States, supplying them with a little bit of money, and telling them to hold on, wait for a little while, don't give up. And Ronald Reagan came to town. And Reagan had a very different outlook on Central America than Carter did. Reagan saw what happened in Nicaragua not as a populist uprising, as most of the rest of the world did. He saw it as this band of communists down there, there was going to be another Fidel Castro, and he was going to have another Cuba in his backyard. Which fit in very well with the CIA's thinking. So, the CIA under Reagan got it together, and they said, "We're going to help these guys out." They authorized $19 million to fund a covert war to destabilize the government in Nicaragua and help get their old buddies back in power.
Soon after the CIA took over this operation, these two drug traffickers, who had come from Nicaragua and settled in California, were called down to Honduras. And they met with a CIA agent named Enrique Bermúdez, who was one of Somoza's military officials, and the man the CIA picked to run this new organization they were forming. And both traffickers had said -- one of them said, the other one wrote, and it's never been contradicted -- that when they met with the CIA agent, he told them, "We need money for this operation. Your guy's job is to go to California and raise money, and not to worry about how you did it. And what he said was -- and I think this had been used to justify just about every crime against humanity that we've known -- "the ends justify the means."
Now, this is a very important link in this chain reaction, because the means they selected was cocaine trafficking, which is sort of what you'd expect when you ask cocaine traffickers to go out and raise money for you. You shouldn't at all be surprised when they go out and sell drugs. Especially when you pick people who are like pioneers of the cocaine trafficking business, which Norwin Meneses certainly was.
There was a CIA cable from I believe 1984, which called him the "kingpin of narcotics trafficking" in Central America. He was sort of like the Al Capone of Nicaragua. So after getting these fundraising instructions from this CIA agent, these two men go back to California, and they begin selling cocaine. This time not exclusively for themselves -- this time in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy. And they began selling it in Los Angeles, and they began selling it in San Francisco.
Sometime in 1982, Danilo Blandón, who had been given the LA market, started selling his cocaine to a young drug dealer named Ricky Ross, who later became known as "Freeway" Rick. In 1994, the LA Times would describe him as the master marketer most responsible for flooding the streets of Los Angeles with cocaine. In 1979, he was nothing. He was nothing before he met these Nicaraguans. He was a high school dropout. He was a kid who wanted to be a tennis star, who was trying to get a tennis scholarship, but he found out that in order to get a scholarship you needed to read and write, and he couldn't. So he drifted out of school and wound up selling stolen car parts, and then he met these Nicaraguans, who had this cheap cocaine that they wanted to unload. And he proved to be very good at that.
Now, he lived in South Central Los Angeles, which was home to some street gangs known as the Crips and the Bloods. And back in 1981-82, hardly anybody knew who they were. They were mainly neighborhood kids -- they'd beat each other up, they'd steal leather coats, they'd steal cars, but they were really nothing back then. But what they gained through this organization, and what they gained through Ricky Ross, was a built-in distribution network throughout the neighborhood. The Crips and the Bloods were already selling marijuana, they were already selling PCP, so it wasn't much of a stretch for them to sell something new, which is what these Nicaraguans were bringing in, which was cocaine.
This is where these forces of history come out of nowhere and collide. Right about the time the contras got to South Central Los Angeles, hooked up with "Freeway" Rick, and started selling powder cocaine, the people Rick was selling his powder to started asking him if he knew how to make it into this stuff called "rock" that they were hearing about. This obviously was crack cocaine, and it was already on its way to the United States by then -- it started in Peru in '74 and was working its way upward, and it was bound to get here sooner or later. In 1981 it got to Los Angeles, and people started figuring out how to take this very expensive powdered cocaine and cook it up on the stove and turn it into stuff you could smoke.
When Ricky went out and he started talking to his customers, and they started asking him how to make this stuff, you know, Rick was a smart guy -- he still is a smart guy -- and he figured, this is something new. This is customer demand. If I want to progress in this business, I better meet this demand. So he started switching from selling powder to making rock himself, and selling it already made. He called this new invention his "Ready Rock." And he told me the scenario, he said it was a situation where he'd go to a guy's house, he would say, "Oh man, I want to get high, I'm on my way to work, I don't have time to go into the kitchen and cook this stuff up. Can't you cook it up for me and just bring it to me already made?" And he said, "Yeah, I can do that." So he started doing it.
So by the time crack got ahold of South Central, which took a couple of years, Rick had positioned himself on top of the crack market in South Central. And by 1984, crack sales had supplanted marijuana and PCP sales as sources of income for the gangs and drug dealers of South Central. And suddenly these guys had more money than they knew what to do with. Because what happened with crack, it democratized the drug. When you were buying it in powdered form, you were having to lay out a hundred bucks for a gram, or a hundred and fifty bucks for a gram. Now all you needed was ten bucks, or five bucks, or a dollar -- they were selling "dollar rocks" at one point. So anybody who had money and wanted to get high could get some of this stuff. You didn't need to be a middle-class or wealthy drug user anymore.
Suddenly the market for this very expensive drug expanded geometrically. And now these dealers, who were making a hundred bucks a day on a good day, were now making five or six thousand dollars a day on a good day. And the gangs started setting up franchises -- they started franchising rock houses in South Central, just like McDonald's. And you'd go on the streets, and there'd be five or six rock houses owned by one guy, and five or six rock houses owned by another guy, and suddenly they started making even more money.
And now they've got all this money, and they felt nervous. You get $100,000 or $200,000 in cash in your house, and you start getting kind of antsy about it. So now they wanted weapons to guard their money with, and to guard their rock houses, which other people were starting to knock off. And lo and behold, you had weapons. The contras. They were selling weapons. They were buying weapons. And they started selling weapons to the gangs in Los Angeles. They started selling them AR-15s, they started selling them Uzis, they started selling them Israeli-made pistols with laser sights, just about anything. Because that was part of the process here. They were not just drug dealers, they were taking the drug money and buying weapons with it to send down to Central America with the assistance of a great number of spooky CIA folks, who were getting them [audio glitch -- "across the border"?] and that sort of thing, so they could get weapons in and out of the country. So, not only does South Central suddenly have a drug problem, they have a weapons problem that they never had before. And you started seeing things like drive-by shootings and gang bangers with Uzis.
By 1985, the LA crack market had become saturated. There was so much dope going into South Central, dope that the CIA, we now know, knew of, and they knew the origins of -- the FBI knew the origins of it; the DEA knew the origins of it; and nobody did anything about it. (We'll get into that in a bit.)
But what happened was, there were so many people selling crack that the dealers were jostling each other on the corners. And the smaller ones decided, we're going to take this show on the road. So they started going to other cities. They started going to Bakersfield, they started going to Fresno, they started going to San Francisco and Oakland, where they didn't have crack markets, and nobody knew what this stuff was, and they had wide open markets for themselves. And suddenly crack started showing up in city after city after city, and oftentimes it was Crips and Bloods from Los Angeles who were starting these markets. By 1986, it was all up and down the east coast, and by 1989, it was nationwide.
Today, fortunately, crack use is on a downward trend, but that's something that isn't due to any great progress we've made in the so-called "War on Drugs," it's the natural cycle of things. Drug epidemics generally run from 10 to 15 years. Heroin is now the latest drug on the upswing.
Now, a lot of people disagreed with this scenario. The New York Times, the LA Times and the Washington Post all came out and said, oh, no, that's not so. They said this couldn't have happened that way, because crack would have happened anyway. Which is true, somewhat. As I pointed out in the first chapter of my book, crack was on its way here. But whether it would have happened the same way, whether it would have happened in South Central, whether it would have happened in Los Angeles at all first, is a very different story. If it had happened in Eugene, Oregon first, it might not have gone anywhere. [Restless shuffling and the sounds of throats being cleared among the audience.] No offense, but you folks aren't exactly trend setters up here when it comes to drug dealers and drug fads. LA is, however. [Soft laughter and murmuring among the audience.]
You can play "what if" games all you like, but it doesn't change the reality. And the reality is that this CIA-connected drug ring played a very critical role in the early 1980s in opening up South Central to a crack epidemic that was unmatched in its severity and influence anywhere in the U.S.
One question that I ask people who say, "Oh, I don't believe this," is, okay, tell me this: why did crack appear in black neighborhoods first? Why did crack distribution networks leapfrog from one black neighborhood to other black neighborhoods and bypass white neighborhoods and bypass Hispanic neighborhoods and Asian neighborhoods? Our government and the mainstream media have given us varying explanations for this phenomenon over the years, and they are nice, comforting, general explanations which absolve anyone of any responsibility for why crack is so ethnically specific. One of the reasons we're told is that, well, it's poverty. As if the only poor neighborhoods in this country were black neighborhoods. And we're told it's high teenage unemployment; these kids gotta have jobs. As if the hills and hollows of Appalachia don't have teenage unemployment rates that are ten times higher than inner city Los Angeles. And then we're told that it's loose family structure -- you know, presuming that there are no white single mothers out there trying to raise kids on low-paying jobs or welfare and food stamps. And then we're told, well, it's because crack is so cheap -- because it sells for a lower price in South Central than it sells anywhere else. But twenty bucks is twenty bucks, no matter where you go in the country.
So once you have eliminated these sort of non-sensical explanations, you are left with two theories which are far less comfortable. The first theory -- which is not something I personally subscribe to, but it's out there -- is that there's something about black neighborhoods which causes them to be genetically predisposed to drug trafficking. That's a racist argument that no one in their right mind is advancing publicly, although I tell you, when I was reading a lot of the stories in the Washington Post and the New York Times, they were talking about black Americans being more susceptible to "conspiracy theories" than white Americans, which is why they believe the story more. I think that was sort of the underlying current there. On the other hand, I didn't see any stories about all the white people who think Elvis is alive still, or that Hitler's brain is preserved down in Brazil to await the Fourth Reich... [laughter from the audience] ...which is a particularly white conspiracy theory, I didn't see any stories in the New York Times about that...
The other more palatable reason which in my mind comes closer to the truth, is that someone started bringing cheap cocaine into black neighborhoods right at the time when drug users began figuring out how to turn it into crack. And this allowed black drug dealers to get a head start on every other ethnic group in terms of setting up distribution systems and trafficking systems.
Now, one thing I've learned about the drug business while researching this is that in many ways it is the epitome of capitalism. It is the purest form of capitalism. You have no government regulation, a wide-open market, a buyer's market -- anything goes. But these things don't spring out of the ground fully formed. It's like any business. It takes time to grow them. It takes time to set up networks. So once these distribution networks got set up and established in primarily South Central Los Angeles, primarily black neighborhoods, they spread it along ethnic and cultural lines. You had black dealers from LA going to black neighborhoods in other cities, because they knew people there, they had friends there, and that's why you saw these networks pop up from one black neighborhood to another black neighborhood.
Now, exactly the same thing happened on the east coast a couple of years later. When crack first appeared on the east coast, it appeared in Caribbean neighborhoods in Miami -- thanks largely to the Jamaicans, who were using their drug profits to fund political gains back home. It was almost the exact opposite of what happened in LA in that the politics were the opposite -- but it was the same phenomenon. And once the Miami market was saturated, they moved to New York, they moved east, and they started bringing crack from the east coast towards the middle of the country.
So it seems to me that if you're looking for the root of your drug problems in a neighborhood, nothing else matters except the drugs, and where they're coming from, and how they're getting there. And all these other reasons I cited are used as explanations for how crack became popular, but it doesn't explain how the cocaine got there in the first place. And that's where the contras came in.
One of the things which these newspapers who dissed my story were saying was, we can't believe that the CIA would know about drug trafficking and let it happen. That this idea that this agency which gets $27 billion a year to tell us what's going on, and which was so intimately involved with the contras they were writing their press releases for them, they wouldn't know about this drug trafficking going on under their noses. But the Times and the Post all uncritically reported their claims that the CIA didn't know what was going on, and that it would never permit its hirelings to do anything like that, as unseemly as drug trafficking. You know, assassinations and bombings and that sort of thing, yeah, they'll admit to right up front, but drug dealing, no, no, they don't do that kind of stuff.
Unfortunately, though, it was true, and what has happened since my series came out is that the CIA was forced to do an internal review, the DEA and Justice Department were forced to do internal reviews, and these agencies that released these reports, you probably didn't read about them, because they contradicted everything else these other newspapers had been writing for the last couple of years, but let me just read you this one excerpt. This is from a 1987 DEA report. And this is about this drug ring in Los Angeles that I wrote about. In 1987, the DEA sent undercover informants inside this drug operation, and they interviewed one of the principals of this organization, namely Ivan Torres. And this is what he said. He told the informant:
"The CIA wants to know about drug trafficking, but only for their own purposes, and not necessarily for the use of law enforcement agencies. Torres told DEA Confidential Informant 1 that CIA representatives are aware of his drug-related activities, and that they don't mind. He said they had gone so far as to encourage cocaine trafficking by members of the contras, because they know it's a good source of income. Some of this money has gone into numbered accounts in Europe and Panama, as does the money that goes to Managua from cocaine trafficking. Torres told the informant about receiving counterintelligence training from the CIA, and had avowed that the CIA looks the other way and in essence allows them to engage in narcotics trafficking."
This is a DEA report that was written in 1987, when this operation was still going on. Another member of this organization who was affiliated with the San Francisco end of it, said that in 1985 -- and this was to the CIA -- "Cabezas claimed that the contra cocaine operated with the knowledge of, and under the supervision of, the CIA. Cabezas claimed that this drug enterprise was run with the knowledge of CIA agent Ivan Gómez."
Now, this is one of the stories that I tried to do at the Mercury News was who this man Ivan Gómez was. This was after my original series came out, and after the controversy started. I went back to Central America, and I found this fellow Cabezas and he told me all about Ivan Gómez. And I came back, I corroborated it with three former contra officials. Mercury News wouldn't put it in the newspaper. And they said, "We have no evidence this man even exists."
Well, the CIA Inspector General's report came out in October, and there was a whole chapter on Ivan Gómez. And the amazing thing was that Ivan Gómez admitted in a CIA-administered polygraph test that he had been engaged in laundering drug money the same month that this man told me he had been engaged in it. CIA knew about it, and what did they do? Nothing. They said okay, go back to work. And they covered it up for fifteen years.
So, the one thing that I've learned from this whole experience is, first of all, you can't believe the government -- on anything. And you especially can't believe them when they're talking about important stuff, like this stuff. The other thing is that the media will believe the government before they believe anything.
This has been the most amazing thing to me. You had a situation where you had another newspaper who reported this information. The major news organizations in this country went to the CIA, they went to the Justice Department, and they said, what about it? And they said, oh, no, it's not true. Take our word for it. And they went back and put it in the newspaper! Now, I try to imagine what would happen had reporters come back to their editors and said, look, I know the CIA is involved in drug trafficking. And I know the FBI knows about it, and I've got a confidential source that's telling me that. Can I write a story about that? What do you think the answer would have been? [Murmurs of "no" from the audience.] Get back down to the obit desk. Start cranking out those sports scores. But, if they go to the government and the government denies something like that, they'll put it in the paper with no corroboration whatsoever.
And it's only since the government has admitted it that now the media is willing to consider that there might be a story here after all. The New York Times, after the CIA report that came out, ran a story on its front page saying, gosh, the contras were involved in drugs after all, and gosh, the CIA knew about it.
Now you would think -- at least I would think -- that something like that would warrant Congressional investigation. We're spending millions of dollars to find out how many times Bill Clinton had sex with Monica Lewinsky. Why aren't we interested in how much the CIA knew about drug traffic? Who was profiting from this drug traffic? Who else knew about it? And why did it take some guy from a California newspaper by accident stumbling over this stuff ten years later in order for it to be important? I mean, what the hell is going on here? I've been a reporter for almost twenty years. To me, this is a natural story. The CIA is involved in drug trafficking? Let's know about it. Let's find out about it. Let's do something about it. Nobody wants to touch this thing.
And the other thing that came out just recently, which nobody seems to know about, because it hasn't been reported -- the CIA Inspector General went before Congress in March and testified that yes, they knew about it. They found some documents that indicated that they knew about it, yeah. I was there, and this was funny to watch, because these Congressmen were up there, and they were ready to hear the absolution, right? "We had no evidence that this was going on..." And this guy sort of threw 'em a curve ball and admitted that it had happened.
One of the people said, well geez, what was the CIA's responsibility when they found out about this? What were you guys supposed to do? And the Inspector General sort of looked around nervously, cleared his throat and said, "Well... that's kind of an odd history there." And Norman Dix from Washington, bless his heart, didn't let it go at that. He said, "Explain what you mean by that?" And the Inspector General said, well, we were looking around and we found this document, and according to the document, we didn't have to report this to anybody. And they said, "How come?" And the IG said, we don't know exactly, but there was an agreement made in 1982 between Bill Casey -- a fine American, as we all know [laughter from the audience] -- and William French Smith, who was then the Attorney General of the United States. And they reached an agreement that said if there is drug trafficking involved by CIA agents, we don't have to tell the Justice Department. Honest to God. Honest to God. Actually, this is now a public record, this document. Maxine Waters just got copies of it, she's putting it on the Congressional Record. It is now on the CIA's web site, if you care to journey into that area. If you do, check out the CIA Web Site for Kids, it's great, I love it. [Laugher from the audience.] I kid you not, they've actually got a web page for kids.
The other thing about this agreement was, this wasn't just like a thirty-day agreement -- this thing stayed in effect from 1982 until 1995. So all these years, these agencies had a gentleman's agreement that if CIA assets or CIA agents were involved in drug trafficking, it did not need to be reported to the Justice Department.
So I think that eliminates any questions that drug trafficking by the contras was an accident, or was a matter of just a few rotten apples. I think what this said was that it was anticipated by the Justice Department, it was anticipated by the CIA, and steps were taken to ensure that there was a loophole in the law, so that if it ever became public knowledge, nobody would be prosecuted for it.
The other thing is, when George Bush pardoned -- remember those Christmas pardons that he handed out when he was on his way out the door a few years ago? The media focused on old Caspar Weinberger, got pardoned, it was terrible. Well, if you looked down the list of names at the other pardons he handed out, there was a guy named Claire George, there was a guy named Al Fiers, there was another guy named Joe Fernández. And these stories sort of brushed them off and said, well, they were CIA officials, we're not going to say much more about it. These were the CIA officials who were responsible for the contra war. These were the men who were running the contra operation. And the text of Bush's pardon not only pardons them for the crimes of Iran-contra, it pardons them for everything. So, now that we know about it, we can't even do anything about it. They all received presidential pardons.
So where does that leave us? Well, I think it sort of leaves us to rely on the judgment of history. But that is a dangerous step. We didn't know about this stuff two years ago; we know about it now. We've got Congressmen who are no longer willing to believe that CIA agents are "honorable men," as William Colby called them. And we've got approximately a thousand pages of evidence of CIA drug trafficking on the public record finally.
That said, let me tell you, there are thousands of pages more that we still don't know about. The CIA report that came out in October was originally 600 pages; by the time we got ahold of it, it was only 300 pages.
One last thing I want to mention -- Bob Parry, who is a fine investigative reporter, he runs a magazine in Washington called I.F. Magazine, and he's got a great website, check it out -- he did a story about two weeks ago about some of the stuff that was contained in the CIA report that we didn't get to see. And one of the stories he wrote was about how there was a second CIA drug ring in South Central Los Angeles that ran from 1988 to 1991. This was not even the one I wrote about. There was another one there. This was classified.
The interesting thing is, it was run by a CIA agent who had participated in the contra war, and the reason it was classified is because it is under investigation by the CIA. I doubt very seriously that we'll ever hear another word about that.
But the one thing that we can do, and the one thing that Maxine Waters is trying to do, is force the House Intelligence Committee to hold hearings on this. This is supposed to be the oversight committee of the CIA. They have held one hearing, and after they found out there was this deal that they didn't have to report drug trafficking, they all ran out of the room, they haven't convened since.
So if you're interested in pursuing this, the thing I would suggest you do is, call up the House Intelligence Committee in Washington and ask them when we're going to have another CIA/contra/crack hearing. Believe me, it'll drive them crazy. Send them email, just ask them, make sure -- they think everybody's forgotten about this. I mean, if you look around the room tonight, I don't think it's been forgotten. They want us to forget about it. They want us to concentrate on sex crimes, because, yeah, it's titillating. It keeps us occupied. It keeps us diverted. Don't let them do it.
Thanks very much for your attention, I appreciate it. We'll do questions and answers now for as long as you want.
Gary Webb: I've been instructed to repeat the question, so...
Voice From the Audience: You talked about George Bush pardoning people. Given George Bush's history with the CIA, do you know when he first knew about this, and what he knew?
Gary Webb: Well, I didn't at the time I wrote the book, I do now. The question was, when did George Bush first know about this? The CIA, in its latest report, said that they had prepared a detailed briefing for the vice president -- I think it was 1985? -- on all these allegations of contra drug trafficking and delivered it to him personally. So, it's hard for George to say he was out of the loop on this one.
I'll tell you another thing, one of the most amazing things I found in the National Archives was a report that had been written by the U.S. Attorney's Office in Tampa -- I believe it was 1987. They had just busted a Colombian drug trafficker named Allen Rudd, and they were using him as a cooperating witness. Rudd agreed to go undercover and set up other drug traffickers, and they were debriefing him.
Now, let me set the stage for you. When you are being debriefed by the federal government for use as an informant, you're not going to go in there and tell them crazy-sounding stories, because they're not going to believe you, they're going to slap you in jail, right? What Rudd told them was, that he was involved in a meeting with Pablo Escobar, who was then the head of the Medellín cartel. They were working out arrangements to set up cocaine shipments into South Florida. He said Escobar started ranting and raving about that damned George Bush, and now he's got that South Florida Drug Task Force set up which has really been making things difficult, and the man's a traitor. And he used to deal with us, but now he wants to be president and thinks that he's double-crossing us. And Rudd said, well, what are you talking about? And Escobar said, we made a deal with that guy, that we were going to ship weapons to the contras, they were in there flying weapons down to Columbia, we were unloading weapons, we were getting them to the contras, and the deal was, we were supposed to get our stuff to the United States without any problems. And that was the deal that we made. And now he double-crossed us.
So the U.S. Attorney heard this, and he wrote this panicky memo to Washington saying, you know, this man has been very reliable so far, everything he's told us has checked out, and now he's saying that the Vice President of the United States is involved with drug traffickers. We might want to check this out. And it went all the way up -- the funny thing about government documents is, whenever it passes over somebody's desk, they have to initial it. And this thing was like a ladder, it went all the way up and all the way up, and it got up to the head of the Criminal Division at the Justice Department, and he looked at it and said, looks like a job for Lawrence Walsh! And so he sent it over to Walsh, the Iran-contra prosecutor, and he said, here, you take it, you deal with this. And Walsh's office -- I interviewed Walsh, and he said, we didn't have the authority to deal with that. We were looking at Ollie North. So I said, did anybody investigate this? And the answer was, "no." And that thing sat in the National Archives for ten years, nobody ever looked at it.
Voice From the Audience: Is that in your book?
Gary Webb: Yeah.
Voice From the Audience: Thank you.
Audience Member #1: Well, first of all, I'd like to thank you for pursuing this story, you have a lot of guts to do it.
[Applause from the audience.]
Gary Webb: This is what reporters are supposed to do. This is what reporters are supposed to do. I don't think I was doing anything special.
Audience Member #1: Still, there's not too many guys like you that are doing it.
Gary Webb: That's true, they've all still got jobs.
[Laughter, scattered applause.]
Audience Member #1: I just had a couple of questions, the first one is, I followed the story on the web site, and I thought it was a really great story, it was really well done. And I noticed that the San Jose Mercury News seemed to support you for a while, and then all the sudden that support collapsed. So I was wondering what your relationship is with your editor there, and how that all played out, and when they all pulled out the rug from under you.
Gary Webb: Well, the support collapsed probably after the LA Times... The Washington [Post] came out first, the New York Times came out second, and the LA Times came out third, and they started getting nervous. There's a phenomenon in the media we all know, it's called "piling on," and they started seeing themselves getting piled on. They sent me back down to Central America two more times to do more reporting and I came back with stories that were even more outrageous than what they printed in the newspaper the first time. And they were faced with a situation of, now we're accusing Oliver North of being involved in drug trafficking. Now we're accusing the Justice Department of being part and parcel to this. Geez, if we get beat up over accusing a couple of CIA agents of being involved in this, what the hell is going to happen now? And they actually said, I had memos saying, you know, if we run these stories, there is going to be a firestorm of criticism.
So, I think they took the easy way out. The easy way out was not to go ahead and do the story. It was to back off the story. But they had a problem, because the story was true. And it isn't every day that you're confronted with how to take a dive on a true story.
They spent several months -- honestly, literally, because I was getting these drafts back and forth -- trying to figure out how to say, we don't support this story, even though it's true. And if you go back and you read the editor's column, you'll see that the great difficulty that he had trying to take a dive on this thing. And he ended up talking about "gray areas" that should have been explored a little more and "subtleties" that we should have not brushed over so lightly, without disclosing the fact that the series had originally been four parts and they cut it to three parts, because "nobody reads four part series' anymore." So, that was one reason.
The other reason was, you know, one of the things you learn very quickly when you get into journalism is that there's safety in numbers. Editors don't like being out there on a limb all by themselves. I remember very clearly going to press conferences, coming back, writing a story, sending it in, and my editor calling up and saying, well gee, this isn't what AP wrote. Or, the Chronicle just ran their story, and that's not what the Chronicle wrote. And I'd say, "Fine. Good." And they said, no, we've got to make it the same, we don't want to be different. We don't want our story to be different from everybody else's.
And so what they were seeing at the Mercury was, the Big Three newspapers were sitting on one side of the fence, and they were out there by themselves, and that just panicked the hell out of them. So, you have to understand newspaper mentality to understand it a little bit, but it's not too hard to understand cowardice, either. I think a lot of that was that they were just scared as hell to go ahead with the story.
Audience Member #1: Were they able to look you in the eye, and...
Gary Webb: No. They didn't, they just did this over the phone. I went to Sacramento.
Audience Member #1: When did you find out about it, and what did you...
Gary Webb: Oh, they called me up at home, two months after I turned in my last four stories, and said, we're going to write a column saying, you know, we're not going ahead with this. And that's when I jumped in the car and drove up there and said, what the hell's going on? And I got all these mealy-mouthed answers, you know, geez, gray areas, subtleties, one thing or another... But I said, tell me one thing that's wrong with the story, and nobody could ever point to anything. And today, to this day, nobody has ever said there was a factual error in that story.
[Inaudible question from the audience.]
Gary Webb: The question was, the editors are one thing, what about the readers? Um... who cares about the readers? Honestly. The reader's don't run the newspaper.
[Another inaudible question from the audience regarding letters to the editor and boycotts of the newspaper.]
Gary Webb: Well, a number of them did, and believe me, the newspaper office was flooded with calls and emails. And the newspaper, to their credit, printed a bunch of them, calling it the most cowardly thing they'd ever seen. But in the long run, the readers, you know, don't run the place. And that's the thing about newspaper markets these days. You folks really don't have any choice! What else are you going to read? And the editors know this.
When I started in this business, we had two newspapers in town where I worked in Cincinnati. And we were deathly afraid that if we sat on a story for 24 hours, the Cincinnati Inquirer was going to put it in the paper, and we were going to look like dopes. We were going to look like we were covering stuff up, we were going to look like we were protecting somebody. So we were putting stuff in the paper without thinking about it sometimes, but we got it in the paper. Now, we can sit on stuff for months, who's going to find out about it? And even if somebody found out about it, what are they going to do? That's the big danger that everybody has sort of missed. These one-newspaper towns, you've got no choice. You've got no choice. And television? Television's not going to do it. I mean, they're down filming animals at the zoo!
[Laughter and applause.]
Audience Member #2: I assume you have talked to John Cummings, the one that wrote Compromised, that book?
Gary Webb: I talked to Terry Reed, who was the principal author on that, yeah.
Audience Member #2: Well, that was a well-documented book, and I had just finished reading this when I happened to look down and see the headlines on the Sunday paper. And he stated that Oliver North told him personally that he was a CIA asset that manufactured weapons.
Gary Webb: Right.
Audience Member #2: When he discovered that they were importing cocaine, he got out of there. And they chased him with his family across country for two years trying to catch him. But he had said in that book that Oliver North told him that Vice President Bush told Oliver North to dirty Clinton's men with the drug money. Which I assumed was what Whitewater was all about, was finding the laundering and trying to find something on Clinton. Do you know anything about that?
Gary Webb: Yeah, let me sum up your question. Essentially, you're asking about the goings-on in Mena, Arkansas, because of the drug operations going on at this little air base in Arkansas while Clinton was governor down there. The fellow you referred to, Terry Reed, wrote a book called Compromised which talked about his role in this corporate operation in Mena which was initially designed to train contra pilots -- Reed was a pilot -- and it was also designed after the Boland Amendment went into effect to get weapons parts to the contras, because the CIA couldn't provide them anymore. And as Reed got into this weapons parts business, he discovered that the CIA was shipping cocaine back through these weapons crates that were coming back into the United States. And when he blew the whistle on it, he was sort of sent on this long odyssey of criminal charges being filed against him, etcetera etcetera etcetera. A lot of what Reed wrote is accurate as far as I can tell, and a lot of it was documented.
There is a House Banking Committee investigation that has been going on now for about three years, looking specifically at Mena, Arkansas, looking specifically at a drug trafficker named Barry Seal, who was one of the biggest cocaine and marijuana importers in the south side of the United States during the 1980s. Seal was also, coincidentally, working for the CIA, and was working for the Drug Enforcement Administration.
I don't know how many of you remember this, but one night Ronnie Reagan got on TV and held up a grainy picture, and said, here's proof that the Sandanistas are dealing drugs. Look, here's Pablo Escobar, and they're all loading cocaine into a plane, and this was taken in Nicaragua. This was the eve of a vote on the contra aid. That photograph was set up by Barry Seal. The plane that was used was Seal's plane, and it was the same plane that was shot down over Nicaragua a couple of years later that Eugene Hasenfus was in, that broke open the whole Iran-contra scandal.
The Banking Committee is supposed to be coming out with a report in the next couple of months looking at the relationship between Barry Seal, the U.S. government and Clinton's folks. Alex Cockburn has done a number of stories on this company called Park-On Meter down in Russellville, Arkansas, that's hooked up with Clinton's family, hooked up with Hillary's law firm, that sort of thing. To me, that's a story people ought to be looking at. I never thought Whitewater was much of a story, frankly. What I thought the story was about was Clinton's buddy Dan Lasater, the bond broker down there who was a convicted cocaine trafficker. Clinton pardoned him on his way to Washington. Lasater was a major drug trafficker, and Terry Reed's book claims Lasater was part and parcel with this whole thing.
Voice From the Audience: Cockburn's newsletter is called Counterpunch, and he's done a good job of defending you in it.
Gary Webb: Yeah, Cockburn has also written a book called Whiteout, which is a very interesting look at the history of CIA drug trafficking. Actually, I think it's selling pretty well itself. The New York Times hated it, of course, but what else is new?
Audience Member #2: Well I just wanted to mention that he states also -- I guess it was Terry Reed who was actually doing the work -- he said Bush was running the whole thing as vice president.
Gary Webb: I think that George Bush's role in this whole thing is one of the large unexplored areas of it.
Audience Member #2: Which is why I think Reagan put him in as vice president, because of his position with the CIA.
Gary Webb: Well, you know, that whole South Florida Drug Task Force was full of CIA operatives. Full of them. This was supposed to be our vanguard in the war against cocaine cartels, and if those Colombians are to be believed, this was the vehicle that we were using to ship arms and allow cocaine into the country, this Drug Task Force. Nobody's looked at that. But there are lots of clues that there's a lot to be dug out.
Audience Member #3: Thank you, Gary. I lost my feature columnist position at my college paper for writing a satire of Christianity some years ago, and...
Gary Webb: That'll do it, yeah. [Laughter from the audience.]
Audience Member #3: And I lost my job twice in the last five years because of my activism in the community, but I got a job [inaudible]. But my question is, I knew someone in the mid-'80s who said that he was in the Navy, and that he had information that the Navy was involved in delivering cocaine to this country. Another kind of bombshell, I'd like to have you comment on it, I saw a video some years ago that said the UFO research that's being done down in the southwest is being funded by drug money and cocaine dealings by the CIA, and that there are 25 top secret levels of government above the Top Secret category, and that there are some levels that even the president doesn't know about. So there's another topic for another book, I just wanted to have you comment...
Gary Webb: A number of topics for another book. [Laughter from the audience.] I don't know about the UFO research, but I do know you're right that we have very little idea how vast the intelligence community in this country is, or what they're up to. I think there's a great story brewing -- it's called the ECHELON program, and it involves the sharing of eavesdropped emails and cell phone communications, because it is illegal for them to do it in this country. So they've been going to New Zealand and Australia and Canada and having those governments eavesdrop on our conversations and tell us about it. I've read a couple of stories about it in the English press, and I read a couple of stories about it in the Canadian press, but I've seen precious little in the American press. But there's stuff on the Internet that circulates about that, if you're interested in the topic. I think it's called the ECHELON program.
Audience Member #4: I'm glad you brought up James Burke and his Connections, because there are a lot of connections here. One I didn't hear too much about, and I know you've done a lot of research on, was how computers and high tech was used by the Crips and Bloods early on. I lived in south LA prior to this, knew some of these people, and you're right, they had virtually no education. And to suddenly have an operation that's computer literate, riding out of Bakersfield, Fresno, on north and then east in a very quick period -- I'm still learning the computer, I'm probably as old as you are, or older -- so I'd like to hear something on that. The whole dislocation of south LA that occurred -- the Watts Festival, the whole empowerment of the black community was occurring beginning in the late '60s and into the early '70s and mid-'70s, and then collapses into a sea of flipping demographics, and suddenly by 1990 it is El Salvadoran-dominated. And that's another curious part of this equation as we talk about drugs.
Gary Webb: Well, that's quite a bevy of things there. As far as the sophistication of the Crips and the Bloods, the one thing that I probably should have mentioned was that when Danilo Blandón went down to South Central to start selling this dope, he had an M.B.A. in marketing. So he knew what he was doing. His job for the Somoza government was setting up wholesale markets for agricultural products. He'd received an M.B.A. thanks to us, actually -- we helped finance him, we helped send him to the University of Bogata to get his M.B.A. so he could go back to Nicaragua, and he actually came to the United States to sell dope to the gangs. So this was a very sophisticated operation.
One of the money launderers from this group was a macro-economist -- his uncle, Orlando Murillo, was on the Central Bank of Nicaragua. The weapons advisor they had was a guy who'd been a cop for fifteen years. They had another weapons advisor who had been a Navy SEAL. You don't get these kinds of people by putting ads in the paper. This is not a drug ring that just sort of falls together by chance. This is like an all-star game. Which is why I suspect more and more that this thing was set up by a higher authority than a couple of drug dealers.
Audience Member #5: Hi Gary, I just want to thank you for going against the traffic on this whole deal. I'm in the journalism school up at U. of O., and I'm interested in the story behind the story. I was hoping you could share some anecdotes about the kind of activity that you engaged in to get the story. For example, when you get off a plane in Nicaragua, what do you do? Where do you start? How do you talk to "Freeway" Ricky? How do you go against a government stonewall?
Gary Webb: The question is, how do you do a story like this, essentially. Well, thing I've always found is, if you go knock on somebody's door, they're a lot less apt to slam it in your face than if you call them up on the telephone. So, the reason I went down to Nicaragua was to go knock on doors. I didn't go down there and just step off a plane -- I found a fellow down in Nicaragua and we hired him as a stringer, a fellow named George Hidell who is a marvelous investigative reporter, he knew all sorts of government officials down there. And I speak no Spanish, which was another handicap. George speaks like four languages. So, you find people like that to help you out.
With these drug dealers, you know, it's amazing how willing they are to talk. I did a series while I was in Kentucky on organized crime in the coal industry. And it was about this mass of stock swindlers who had looted Wall Street back in the '60s and moved down to Kentucky in the '70s while the coal boom was going on, during the energy shortage. The lesson I learned in that thing -- I thought these guys would never talk to me, I figured they'd be crazy to talk to a reporter about the scams they were pulling. But they were happy to talk about it, they were flattered that you would come to them and say, hey, tell me about what you do. Tell me your greatest knock-off. Those guys would go on forever! So, you know, everybody, no matter what they do, they sort of have pride in their work... [Laughter from the audience.] And, you know, I found that when you appeared interested, they would be happy to tell you.
The people who lied to me, the people who slammed doors in my face, were the DEA and the FBI. The DEA called me down -- I wrote about this in the book -- they had a meeting, and they were telling me that if I wrote this story, I was going to help drug traffickers bring drugs into the country, and I was going to get DEA agents killed, and this, that and the other thing, all of which was utterly bullshit. So that's the thing -- just ask. There's really no secret to it.
Audience Member #6: I'd like to ask a couple of questions very quickly. The first one is, if you wouldn't mind being a reference librarian for a moment -- there was the Golden Triangle. I was just wondering if you've ever, in your curiosity about this, touched on that -- the drug rings and the heroin trade out of Southeast Asia. And the second one is about the fellow from the Houston Chronicle, I don't remember his name right off, but you know who I'm talking about, if you could just touch on that a little bit...
Gary Webb: Yes. The first question was about whether I ever touched on what was going on in the Golden Triangle. Fortunately, I didn't have to -- there's a great book called The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, by Alfred McCoy, which is sort of a classic in CIA drug trafficking lore. I don't think you can get any better than that. That's a great reference in the library, you can go check it out. McCoy was a professor at the University of Wisconsin who went to Laos during the time that the secret war in Laos was going on, and he wrote about how the CIA was flying heroin out on Air America. That's the thing that really surprised me about the reaction to my story was, it's not like I invented this stuff. There's a long, long history of CIA involvement in drug traffic which Cockburn gets into in Whiteout.
And the second question was about Pete Brewton -- there was a reporter in Houston for the Houston Post named Pete Brewton who did the series -- I think it was '91 or '92 -- on the strange connections between the S&L collapses, particularly in Texas, and CIA agents. And his theory was that a lot of these collapses were not mismanagement, they were intentional. These things were looted, with the idea that a lot of the money was siphoned off to fund covert operations overseas. And Brewton wrote this series, and it was funny, because after all hell broke loose on my story, I called him up, and he said, "Well, I was waiting for this to happen to you." And I said, "Why?" And he said, "I was exactly like you are. I'd been in this business for twenty years, I'd won all sorts of awards, I'd lectured in college journalism courses, and I wrote a series that had these three little letters C-I-A in it. And suddenly I was unreliable, and I couldn't be trusted, and Reed Irvine at Accuracy In Media was writing nasty things about me, and my editor had lost confidence in me, so I quit the business and went to law school."
Brewton wrote a book called George Bush, CIA and the Mafia. It's hard to find, but it's worth looking up if you can find it. It's all there, it's all documented. See, the difference between his story and my story was, we put ours out on the web, and it got out. Brewton's story is sort of confined to the printed page, and I think the Washington Journalism Review actually wrote a story about, how come nobody's writing about this, nobody's picking up this story. Nobody touched this story, it just sort of died. And the same thing would have happened with my series, had we not had this amazing web page. Thank God we did, or this thing would have just slipped underneath the waves, and nobody would have ever heard about it.
Audience Member #7: I'm glad you're here. I guess the CIA, there was something I read in the paper a couple of years ago, that said the CIA is actually murdering people, and they admitted it, they don't usually do that.
Gary Webb: It's a new burst of honesty from the new CIA.
Audience Member #7: They'll murder us with kindness. In the Chicago police force, there were about 10 officers who were kicked off the police force for doing drugs or selling drugs, and George Bush or something... I heard that he had a buddy who had a lot of money in drug testing equipment, so that's one reason everybody has to pee in a cup now... [Laughter from the audience.] The other thing I found, there was a meth lab close to here, and somebody who wasn't even involved with it, he was paralyzed... And as you know, we have the "Just Say No to Drugs" deal... What do you think we can do to stop us, the People, from being hypnotized once again from all these shenanigans, doing other people injury in terms of these kinds of messages, at the same time they're selling. Because all this money is being spent for all this...
Gary Webb: I guess the question is, what could you do to keep from being hypnotized by the media message, specifically on the Drug War? Is that what you're talking about?
Audience Member #7: Yeah, or all the funds... like, there's another thing here with the meth lab, they say we'll kind of turn people in...
Gary Webb: Oh yeah, the nation of informers.
Audience Member #7: Yeah.
Gary Webb: That's something I have to laugh about -- up until I think '75 or '76, probably even later than that, you could go to your doctor and get methamphetamine. I mean, there were housewives by the hundreds of thousands across the United States who were taking it every day to lose weight, and now all the sudden it was the worst thing on the face of the earth. That's one thing I got into in the book, was the sort of crack hysteria in 1986 that prompted all these crazy laws that are still on the books today, and the 100:1 sentencing ratio... I don't know how many of you saw, on PBS a couple of nights back, there was a great show on informants called "Snitch." [Murmurs of recognition from the audience.] Yeah, on Frontline. That was very heartening to see, because I don't think ten years ago that it would have stood a chance in hell of getting on the air.
What I'm seeing now is that a lot of people are finally waking up to the idea that this "drug war" has been a fraud since the get-go. My personal opinion is, I think the main purpose of this whole drug war was to sort of erode civil liberties, very slowly and very gradually, and sort of put us down into a police state. [Robust burst of applause from the audience.] And we're pretty close to that. I've got to hand it to them, they've done a good job. We have no Fourth Amendment left anymore, we're all peeing in cups, and we're all doing all sorts of things that our parents probably would have marched in the streets about.
The solution to that is to read something other than the daily newspaper, and turn off the TV news. I mean, I'm sorry, I hate to say that, but that's mind-rot. You've got to find alternative sources of information. [Robust applause.]
Voice From the Audience: How can you say that it was all a chain reaction, that it was not done deliberately, and on the other hand say it has at the same time deliberately eroded our rights?
Gary Webb: Well, the question was, how can I say on one hand it was a chain reaction, and on the other hand say the drug war was set up deliberately to erode our rights. I mean, you're talking about sort of macro versus micro. And I do not give the CIA that much credit, that they could plan these vast conspiracies down through the ages and have them work -- most of them don't.
What I'm saying is, you have police groups, you have police lobbying groups, you have prison guard groups -- they seize opportunities when they come along. The Drug War has given them a lot of opportunities to say, okay, now let's lengthen prison sentences. Why? Well, because if you keep people in jail longer, you need more prison guards. Let's build more prisons. Why? Well, people get jobs, prison guards get jobs. The police stay in business. We need to fund more of them. We need to give bigger budgets to the correctional facilities. This is all very conscious, but I don't think anybody sat in a room in 1974 and said, okay, by 1995, we're going to have X number of Americans locked up or under parole supervision. I don't think they mind -- you know, I think they like that. But I don't think it was a conscious effort. I think it was just one bad idea, after another bad idea, compounded with a stupid idea, compounded with a really stupid idea. And here we are. So I don't know if that answers your question or not...
Audience Member #8: To me, the Iran-contra story was one of the most interesting and totally frustrating things. And the more information, the more about it I heard -- we don't know anything about it, I mean, if you look for any official data, they deny everything. And to see Ollie North, the upstanding blue-eyed American, standing there lying through his teeth, and we knew it... [Inaudible comment, "before Congress and the President"?] What galls me is that these people who are guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors are now getting these enormous pensions, and we have to pay for these bums. It sickens me!
Gary Webb: Right.
Audience Member #8: And I actually have a question -- this is my question, by the way, I know you have a thousand other questions [laughter from the audience] -- but the one that stays with me, and has always bothered me, was the Christic Institute, and I thought it was fantastic. And they were hit with this enormous lawsuit, and they had to bail out. This needs to be ["rehired"?] because they knew what they were doing, they had all the right answers, and they were run out of office, so to say, in disgrace, because of this lawsuit.
Gary Webb: The question was about the Christic Institute, and about how the Iran-contra controversy is probably one of the worst scandals. I agree with you, I think the Iran-contra scandal was worse than Watergate, far worse than this nonsense we're doing now. But I'll tell you, I think the press played a very big part in downplaying that scandal. One of the people I interviewed for the book was a woman named Pam Naughton, who was one of the best prosecutors that the Iran-contra committee had. And I asked her, why -- you know, it was also the first scandal that was televised, and I remember watching them at night. I would go to work and I'd set the VCR, and I'd come home at night and I'd watch the hearings. Then I'd pick up the paper the next morning, and it was completely different! And I couldn't figure it out, and this has bothered me all these years.
So when I got Pam Naughton on the phone, I said, what the hell happened to the press corps in Washington during the Iran-contra scandal? And she said, well, I can tell you what I saw. She said, every day, we would come out at the start of this hearings, and we would lay out a stack of documents -- all the exhibits we were going to introduce -- stuff that she thought was extremely incriminating, front page story after front page story, and they'd sit them on a table. And she said, every day the press corps would come in, and they'd say hi, how're you doing, blah blah blah, and they'd go sit down in the front row and start talking about, you know, did you see the ball game last night, and what they saw on Johnny Carson. And she said one or two reporters would go up and get their stack of documents and go back and write about it, and everybody else sat in the front row, and they would sit and say, okay, what's our story today? And they would all agree what the story was, and they'd go back and write it. Most of them never even looked at the exhibits.
And that's why I say it was the press's fault, because there was so much stuff that came out of those hearings. That used to just drive me crazy, you would never see it in the newspaper. And I don't think it's a conspiracy -- if anything, it's a conspiracy of stupidity and laziness. I talked to Bob Parry about this -- when he was working for Newsweek covering Iran-contra, they weren't even letting him go to the hearings. He had to get transcripts messengered to him at his house secretly, so his editors wouldn't find out he was actually reading the transcripts, because he was writing stories that were so different from everybody else's.
Bob Parry tells a story of being at a dinner party with Bobby Inman from the CIA, the editor of Newsweek, and all the muckity-mucks -- this was his big introduction into Washington society. And they were sitting at the dinner table in the midst of the Iran-contra thing, talking about everything but Iran-contra. And Bob said he had the bad taste of bringing up the Iran-contra hearing and mentioning one particularly bad aspect of it. And he said, the editor of Newsweek looked at him and said, "You know, Bob, there are just some things that it's better the country just doesn't know about." And all these admirals and generals sitting around the table all nodded their heads in agreement, and they wanted to talk about something else.
That's the attitude. That's the attitude in Washington. And that's the attitude of the Washington press corps, and nowadays it's even worse than that, because now, if you play the game right, you get a TV show. Now you've got the McLaughlin Group. Now you get your mug on CNN. You know. And that's how they keep them in line. If you're a rabble rouser, and a shit-stirrer, they don't want your type on television. They want the pundits.
The other question was about the Christic Institute. They had it all figured out. The Christic Institute had this thing figured out. They filed suit in May of 1986, alleging that the Reagan administration, the CIA, this sort of parallel government was going on. Oliver North was involved in it, you had the Bay of Pigs Cubans that were involved in it down in Costa Rica, they had names, they had dates, and they got murdered. And the Reagan administration's line was, they're a bunch of left-wing liberal crazies, this was conspiracy theory. If you want to see what they really thought, go to Oliver North's diaries, which are public -- the National Security Archive has got them, you can get them -- all he was writing about, after the Christic Institute's suit was filed, was how we've got to shut this thing down, how we have to discredit these witnesses, how we've got to get this guy set up, how we've got to get this guy out of the country... They knew that the Christic Institute was right, and they were deathly afraid that the American public was going to find out about it.
I am convinced that the judge who was hearing the case was part and parcel to the problem. He threw the case out of court and fined the Christic Institute, I think it was $1.3 million, for even bringing the lawsuit. It was deemed "frivolous litigation." And it finally bankrupted them. And they went away.
But that's the problem when you try to take on the government in its own arena, and the federal courts are definitely part of its own arena. They make the rules. And in cases like that, you don't stand a chance in hell, it won't happen.
Voice From the Audience: But if you cannot get the truth in the courts, if you cannot write it in the papers, then what do you do?
Gary Webb: You do it yourself. You do it yourself. You've got to start rebuilding an information system on your own. And that's what's going on. It's very small, but it's happening. People are talking to each other through newsgroups on the Internet. People are doing Internet newsletters.
Voice From the Audience: Do you have a website?
Emcee: Let's use the mike, let's use the mike.
Gary Webb: The question is, do I have a website. No, I don't, but I'm building one.
[Inaudible question from the audience.]
Gary Webb: Well, let's let these people who have been standing in line...
[Commotion, murmuring. Someone calls out, "Please use the mike."]
Audience Member #9: When you mentioned prisons a moment ago, I couldn't help but remember that it is America's fastest-growing industry, the "prison industry" -- which is a hell of a phrase unto itself. But it seems that the CIA had people aligned throughout Central America at one point, and El Salvador, with the contras, and in Honduras and Nicaragua, and in Panama, Manuel Noriega...
Gary Webb: Our "man in Panama," that's right.
Audience Member #9: Yeah. But something went wrong with him, and he got pinched in public. And I'm interested to know what you think about that.
Gary Webb: The question is about Manuel Noriega, who was our "man in Panama" for so many years. What happened to Noriega is that -- I don't think it had anything to do with the fact that he was a drug trafficker, because we knew that for years. What it had to do with was what is going to happen at the end of this year, which is when control of the Panama Canal goes over to the Panamanians. If you read the New York Times story that Seymour Hersh wrote back in June of 1986 that exposed Noriega publicly as a drug trafficker and money launderer, there were some very telling phrases in it. All unsourced, naturally, you know -- unattributed comments from high-ranking government officials -- but they talked about how they were nervous that Noriega had become unreliable. And with control of the Panama Canal reverting to the Panamanian government, they were very nervous at the idea of having somebody as "unstable" as Noriega running the country at that point. And I think that was a well-founded fear. You've got a major drug trafficker controlling a major maritime thoroughway. I can see the CIA being nervous about being cut out of the business. [Laughter from the audience.]
But I think that's what the whole thing with Noriega was about -- they wanted him out of there, because they wanted somebody that they could control a little more closely in power in Panama for when the canal gets reverted back to them.
Audience Member #9: Was there much of a profit difference between Nicaragua and Panama as far as the drugs went?
Gary Webb: Well, what Noriega had done was sort of create an international banking center for drug money. That was his part of it. Nicaragua was nothing ever than just a trans-shipment point. Central America was never anything more than a trans-shipment point. Columbia Peru and Bolivia were the producers, and the planes needed a place to refuel, and that's all that Central America ever was. The banking was all done in Panama.
Audience Member #10: You talk about how they sat on their stories, the newspapers? Why did they suddenly decide to pursue the stories?
Gary Webb: Which stories are these?
Audience Member #10: The stories about the crack dealing and the CIA. Why did they suddenly decide that, well, actually...
Gary Webb: The question was -- correct me if I'm wrong -- the question raised the fact that the other newspapers didn't do anything about this story for a while, and then after I wrote it they came after me. Is that what you're asking?
Audience Member #10: Well, yeah, and then eventually the CIA admitted it... and I mean, why are people asking, it sat for a long time, and then suddenly everyone was on it. What was the turning point that made them decide to pursue it?
Gary Webb: The turning point that made them decide to pursue the story was the fact that it had gotten out over the Internet, and people were calling them up saying, why don't you have the story in your newspaper? You know, I don't think the subject matter frightened the major media as much as the fact that a little newspaper in Northern California was able to set the national agenda for once. And people were marching in the streets, people were holding hearings in Washington, they were demanding Congressional hearings, you had John Deutch, the CIA director, go down on that surreal trip down to South Central to convince everyone that everything was okay... [Laughter from the audience.] And all of this was happening without the big media being involved in it at all. And the reason that happened was because we had an outlet -- we had the web. And the people at the Mercury News did a fantastic job on this website.
And so, news was marching on without them. There's a professor at the University of Wisconsin who's done a paper on the whole "Dark Alliance" thing, and her thesis is that this story was shut down more because of how it got out than for what it actually said. That it was an attempt by the major media to regain control of the Internet, and to suggest that unless they're the ones who are putting it out, it's unreliable. Which I think you see in a lot of stories. The mainstream press gladly promotes the idea that you can't believe anything you read on the Internet, it's all kooks, it's all conspiracy theorists... And there are, I mean, I admit, there are a lot of them out there, but it's not all false. But the idea that we're being taught is, unless it's got our name on it, you can't believe it. So they can retain control of the means of communication anyway.
Audience Member #11: You mentioned Iran-contra, which was private foreign policy in defiance of Congress, which means it was a high crime. From there, we get more drugs, we get erosion of civil liberties and the loss of the Fourth Amendment, which you mentioned. And we have to get that back, because without it, we're just commodities to one another. So what I'd like to ask you is, what are you working on now? And do you have your own journalistic chain of reaction? Are you going to be doing something that connects back to this?
Gary Webb: The question is what am I doing now -- believe it or not, I'm working for the government. [Laughter from the audience.] I work for the California legislature, and I do investigations of state agencies. I just wrote a piece for Esquire magazine which should be out in April on another fabulous DEA program that they're running. Actually, part of it's based here in Oregon, called Operation Pipeline. That story is coming out in April, and Esquire told me they want me to write more stuff for them, they want me to do some investigative reporting for them, so I'll be working for them. And I'm putting together another book proposal, and a couple of other things. I'm not going to work for newspapers any more, I learned my lesson.
Audience Member #12: A year ago the editor of your newspaper was here to speak, sponsored by the University of Oregon School of Journalism. Before I got up here, I took a casual look around -- I don't know all of the members of the journalism faculty, but I didn't recognize any. We did have a student here who got up and asked a question. That leads to this question: I'd like, if you don't mind, to ask if there is someone from the University of Oregon journalism faculty here, would they mind being acknowledged and raising their hand?
Gary Webb: All right, there's one back there.
Audience Member #12: There is one. Okay. [Applause from the audience.] I'm pleased to see it. There is that one person. My point is, I think much of what you've said this evening constitutes an indictment -- and a valid indictment -- of the university journalism programs in this country. [Applause.] Most Americans and I believe -- and I'm interested in your reaction -- that it reinforces that indictment when we see, to that person's credit, that she is the only faculty member from our school of journalism to hear you tonight.
Gary Webb: I think the general question was about the state of the journalism schools. The one thing journalism schools don't teach, by and large, is investigative reporting. They teach stenography very well. That's why I consider most of journalism today to be stenography. You go to a press conference, you write down the quotes accurately, you come back, you don't provide any context, you don't provide any perspective, because that gets into analysis, and heavens knows, we don't want any analysis in our newspapers.
But you report things accurately, you report things fairly, and even if it's a lie you put it in the newspaper, and that's considered journalism. I don't consider that journalism, I consider that stenography. And that is the way they teach journalism in school, that's the way I was taught. Unless you go to a very different journalism school from the kinds that most kids go to, that's what you're taught. Now, there are specialized journalism schools, there are master's programs like the Kiplinger Program at Ohio State, that's very good.
So, I'm not saying that all journalism schools are bad, but they don't teach you to be journalists. They discourage you from doing that, by and large. And I don't think it's the fault of the journalism professors, I just think that's the way things have been taught in this country for so long, that they just do it automatically. I'd be interested in hearing the professor's thoughts about it, but that's sort of the way I look at things. I spent way too many years in journalism school. I kind of got shed of those notions after I got out in the real world.
[End of transcript.]
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